In this interview, Amélie Chelly discusses the structure of the ‘Axis of Resistance’ and Iran’s asymmetric warfare strategy, which has been constrained by an unstable regional context – ranging from the Syrian civil war to recent confrontations with Israel and the United States – leading to developments in its defensive strategy, such as the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. Amélie Chelly holds a PhD in religious and political sociology, specialising in Iran and the analysis of Islamist movements. She is an associate researcher at the Centre d’analyse et d’intervention sociologiques (CADIS). The interview was prepared by Antoine Macquet, an intern at the MENA Research Center.
Do you think the term ‘proxy’ — which is now widely used to refer to pro-Iranian militias in the Middle East — is the most accurate?
The term most commonly used by the Islamic Republic of Iran is the ‘Axis of Muqawama’, which means ‘resistance’. In a world where Islam is held up as a spearhead, there are two words that are used extremely frequently to refer to resistance: ‘Soumoud’ on the one hand, and ‘Muqawama’ on the other. One gets the sense that, from the perspective of the Islamic Republic’s ideology — which, I should remind you, is Velayat al-faqih, that is to say, the guardianship of the jurist-theologian — there is a desire to externalise a number of discursive elements, not all at once — that would be impossible — but selectively.
Some militias are more consistent in their ideological adherence than others, such as Hezbollah. In its charter, it clearly states that if it were to take power in Lebanon, Velayat al-faqih would be applied there too. At the other end of the spectrum, we have Hamas, which signed the charter of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and does not share the same aspirations for a political model at all. Thus, it is more a matter of the terminology of resistance, in the sense of externalising some or all of the discursive elements, in an absolute negation of borders as recognised by diplomatic and international relations.
We must not forget that the Islamic Republic came to power following a revolution and, like all others in the world, its aim is to export its ideology. This has been done, to a very limited extent, with Hezbollah being the most obvious vehicle for this export, even though it was not until 1982 that it began to take on an official structure. But it was the Iran-Iraq War that brought this wave of ideological export to a more or less definitive halt. Afterwards, the Muqawama axis continued to take shape, following a path and employing methods entirely different from those envisaged at the time of the Islamic Republic’s founding.
The Syrian civil war is often portrayed as the ‘high point’ of Iran’s asymmetric warfare strategy, involving the mobilisation of various militias coordinated by the Quds Force to keep Bashar in power. Do you agree with this assessment?
This is certainly the peak of Iran’s regional power. However, I’m not sure this is the point at which the asymmetry is at its greatest. I think that in every arena where Iran has had a hand, we’ve seen pure asymmetry. The example that strikes me as an even greater case of asymmetric warfare is Yemen, not just for circumstantial reasons, but also for geographical ones.
In political science, we have this concept of the ‘backyard’. Every country has a ‘backyard’ with which it is absolutely essential to maintain healthy and cordial relations. The greatest danger is precisely the deterioration of these relations. As a general rule, backyards are the countries that share the longest borders with the country in question. In this case, Yemen is by no means Iran’s backyard; on the contrary, it is Saudi Arabia’s.
However, at the start of the war in Yemen, at the height of hostilities between the Saudi monarchy and Tehran, it was at that very moment that Iran decided to invest very little money in the Houthi militias, with the aim of proving Mohammed bin Salman wrong, as he had promised a lightning war. That is exactly what happened: a war initially predicted to last a few weeks turned into a conflict that became bogged down, despite Tehran committing very few resources. This is pure asymmetry, because it is low-cost – not by necessity, but deliberately conceived and planned as such from the outset.
Meanwhile, as for the Syrian war, it is indeed the height of Iran’s regional influence, but perhaps not the height of asymmetry in its most compelling form, even if it was, of course, to be expected. This regional influence can be explained by several reasons.
Firstly, because Iran supported Bashar al-Assad, who has remained in power. Secondly, because Iran has finally succeeded in combating its existential enemy, Daesh, which regards Shi’ism as its primary enemy, labelling it ‘Persian magic’ – to borrow a term coined by Saddam Hussein, but one that is very frequently repeated by Islamic State officials. And finally, because it allowed Iran to distinguish itself through an anti-Takfirist stance that enabled it to exert regional influence. How can one take the exact opposite stance to this new hydra, to this phenomenon that was the Islamic State, which is still the Islamic State? It is precisely by seeking the opposite of takfirism, an ideology that advocates the murder of other Muslims declared infidels, of which the Islamic State is the most prominent example in the history of contemporary Islamism. There has never been a more takfiri group than this one. The Speicher camp episode is certainly the one that demonstrates this most convincingly.
The Islamic Republic of Iran has placed great emphasis on anti-Takfirism, that is to say, first accepting all interpretations of Islam, whatever they may be, without seeking to eradicate them, and secondly protecting the Ahl al-Kitab, the People of the Book. It is for this reason that the protection of the shrines is part of this approach, with the formation of the ‘martyrs who saved the shrine’, which included many members of the Afghan and Pakistani Muqawama militias, the Fatemyun and the Zainabyun. This anti-Takfirism even extends to the integration of Christian militias within the Shia militias. The Babylon Brigade, for example, which was part of the Hashd al-Shaabi and which, in its propaganda videos, explained very clearly that they were dying in the name of Jesus for the Islamic Republic, truly represents the pinnacle of the desire to be the embodiment of anti-Takfirism.
Did the assassination in January 2020 of Qassem Soleimani, then head of the Al-Quds Force, mark a break in the management of Iran’s network of proxies? And has his successor, Ismael Qaani, managed to continue in his footsteps?
I don’t think there has been any noticeable change in the way the organisation is run. However, there has been a clear shift in its aura and influence. It was said of Qassem Soleimani that he was a culture unto himself, which is not untrue. There were many Iranians who loved him, even though they hated the Islamic Republic – not all of them unanimously, of course. So why?
Firstly, because he was someone whose behaviour was entirely consistent with his beliefs. It is said, for example, that whenever he could, he would lie down beside the bodies of the wounded whom he knew would not survive the night. Above all – and this is the most important point – he was not tainted by any financial scandal. When you consider that the Revolutionary Guards operate on the basis of financial scandal, that makes quite a difference. And above all, he is the figure, the face we associate with the Islamic Republic’s ability to protect the territory against Daesh, which is no small feat.
Indeed, his death marks the loss of a figure who will be very difficult to replace. As for Ismael Qaani, we are still in the dark. I really do think this is a question that requires more time to pass before we can have a proper answer. Especially as between 2020 and now, 2026, there are two years that are more or less significant in terms of understanding the internal transformations within the Al-Quds forces. Indeed, from 2024 onwards, there is even less visibility of what may be happening within the country; in other words, as little information as possible is being allowed to leak out on these matters. Furthermore, there is a great deal of suspicion surrounding Commander Qaani. In the Israeli press and also in the diaspora, much attention is paid to highlighting how strange it is that he has, on each occasion, narrowly escaped an explosion by a matter of minutes. Many even regard him as the key agent who has enabled the State of Israel to target, with such efficiency and precision, all the figures it wished to eliminate.
Does the concept of Velayat al-faqih, which, as you said, forms the ideological basis of the Islamic Republic, still have the same ability to rally support as it did in 1979, particularly among the younger generation?
Outside Iran, yes, I think we can even trace the waning of the enthusiasm it inspired in people back to the 1990s. Disillusionment began at the end of the Iran-Iraq War in 1988–1989, and it has grown over the years. There must be around fifteen per cent of the population who still feel inspired by this ideological foundation. Moreover, the Islamic Republic is well aware of this; for instance, there is still a constant effort in the news to balance a pragmatic discourse with a mystical one. For example, at the first meeting in Islamabad with the Americans, there were 71 people on the Iranian side – a reference to the Battle of Karbala, 71 plus one absent. There is also the number 313, which represents the armies of the return of Al-Mahdi, son of the 11th Imam, and is very frequently used to name katiba (battalions) or to name operations.
They still use this, firstly, to rally the pro-regime base, however small it may be, and secondly, to project an image beyond their borders. For example, regarding the 71 plus one at the last meeting in Islamabad, when I was researching this on social media, it was often Pakistani or Iraqi Shias who were saying, ‘Brilliant, Iran is Karbala, it’s the strength of the weak against the all-powerful’, but there were very few Iranians, in fact.
Do you believe that the fall of Bashar al-Assad in December 2024 represents an irreparable loss for Iranian influence in Syria and for the entire logistics of the Axis of Resistance?
At the moment, yes, but we don’t know what tomorrow will bring. We don’t know whether they will find a way to stop demonising Ahmed Al-Sharaa, the Syrian president, in their rhetoric and manage to reach certain agreements, or to build closer ties with him, even though that strikes me as highly counter-intuitive.
It is important to realise that Syria was the government on which the Islamic Republic relied most heavily. Because its support was total, because it was wholehearted, because it was uncompromising. Syria was the only country which, during the Iran-Iraq War, had unreservedly aided the Islamic Republic and had never given Iraq the slightest bit of support, which is actually quite rare. As a general rule, most countries either sided directly with Iraq or provided a little support to both sides.
There is also another reason for this close relationship: access to the Mediterranean. From the Islamic Republic of Iran’s perspective, the loss of Bashar poses a real problem in this regard. It is for this reason, moreover, that the Islamic Republic has been trying for the past ten years or so to craft narratives aimed at winning over the Bektashi community in Albania, in order to maintain an influence that extends to the Mediterranean.
These two factors are therefore clearly a serious blow to the Muqawama axis. However, it remains to be seen to what extent this situation will persist. For example, will the Islamic Republic start relying on other militias to try to compensate for the lack of diplomatic cordiality with Syria, or might they seek to find a way to improve diplomatic relations with Al-Sharaa?
After 7 October 2023, a series of setbacks befall the entire Axis of Resistance – with the weakening of Hamas and Hezbollah, the assassination of Hassan Nasrallah, the fall of Assad, and culminating in the Twelve-Day War in June 2025 – will the Iranian regime and the Revolutionary Guards manage to keep their proxies operational despite everything?
But as Hezbollah is the jewel in Tehran’s crown, both historically and in terms of ideological outreach—since Hezbollah’s charter is virtually identical to the government’s aspirations—Iran is working flat out to rebuild its forces. We must not forget that, in its early days, the Islamic Republic had its foothold in southern Lebanon. It is as if, ultimately, Hezbollah – without being called as such – existed before the Islamic Republic; there is something deeply historical about that. On the other hand, they would not have gone to such lengths to rebuild, for example, Ansarullah in Yemen, had it been they who had been destroyed. So yes, in the face of weakening, Iran is redoubling its efforts to rebuild its forces very quickly.
As for Hamas, I think there is a certain mistrust of it on the part of the Islamic Republic, even though it is also significant. It allows for the implementation of the ‘boiling frog’ policy, which the Revolutionary Guards particularly appreciate. In other words, the more Hamas steps up its operations, the more the international community will adopt anti-Israeli rhetoric, which serves the interests of the Islamic Republic.
They are wary of Hamas from a purely operational standpoint. This is because Hamas is capable of either failing to carry out orders as required, or taking initiatives that would slip beyond the control of the Revolutionary Guards. On the other hand, in the long term, in terms of the impact on public perception, this still serves the interests of the Islamic Republic, which is the embodiment of the most credible entity in terms of anti-Zionism, especially since the Abraham Accords, with the cascade of normalisation of diplomatic relations between many Arab and Israeli countries.
Following the outbreak of war on 28 February 2026, we see Iran deploying its proxies, such as Hezbollah, Iraqi militias and the Houthis. However, we are also seeing another deterrent emerge, one that appears to be highly valued by Tehran: the Strait of Hormuz, described as the equivalent of ‘an atomic bomb’ by an adviser to the Supreme Leader. In your view, are we witnessing a shift in Iran’s defence strategy?
This isn’t a change in how things work, but it is the crossing of a threshold. Because whenever there have been problems – whether with foreign powers, in the context of nuclear negotiations or otherwise – the Islamic Republic has always brandished the threat of closing the Strait of Hormuz. That is nothing new; it has always been there, at least in people’s minds.
What is new here is that they have done it; a threshold has been crossed. We have moved from words to action, to an operation. A real milestone has been reached, just as many others have been. In other words, for 45 years, the Islamic Republic has been content with rhetoric, saying ‘death to America, death to Israel’, without really taking action, or only indirectly, on other fronts by proxy, as you point out, in Yemen, the Golan Heights, or elsewhere. From 2024 onwards, a first step has been taken, because we are now in a direct confrontation. We are not witnessing a different trajectory, but simply the crossing of thresholds that are entirely unprecedented.
Can you think of any other forms of deterrence – perhaps less costly than proxies – that Tehran might use in this new context?
They’re going to keep a close eye on the Strait of Hormuz, that’s for sure, when it comes to shipping, oil and so on. But what’s even more worrying are the issues surrounding undersea cables. They know that even if everyone manages to reorganise their consumption to do without shipments from the Strait of Hormuz – because they know it’s possible – that every country can decide to focus on other energy sources, or, for example, that France might mend fences with Algeria a bit more openly to take advantage of its oil. They know that the major powers can reorganise their consumption so that the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, even if it takes time, is no longer a bargaining chip. On the other hand, when it comes to cables, it is very difficult to imagine how we could do things differently. Because we have always asked ourselves the question of renewable energy, setting aside the issue of oil, we have been asking ourselves this question for years and years. But when it comes to the internet, we have never asked ourselves the question.
With regard to Iranian domestic politics, are we witnessing the Revolutionary Guards taking control of the regime, particularly through the figure of Ahmad Vahidi? What might the consequences be, particularly for the country’s foreign policy and the Iranian people?
No, we don’t know at this stage. All we know is that this does indeed strengthen the military role of the Revolutionary Guards within the regime, without bringing down the regime. We remain within the same regime and the same structure. It is still called Jomhuriye Eslâmiye (Islamic Republic), there is still the Velayat al-faqih, there is still a Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, even if we do not know whether he truly holds the position envisaged by the Constitution.
Now, we do not know where this is heading, given that they are taking up more space. As a reminder, the Revolutionary Guards are the superego of the Islamic Republic. There are two parallel armies: one that is not coextensive with the regime’s ideological character, meaning that if the Islamic Republic were to fall tomorrow, the Artesh — that is, the regular army — would remain. In contrast, the Revolutionary Guards are coextensive with the Islamic Republic.
At the moment, we’re in the so-called ‘Internet Pro’ phase, which involves restricting access to the internet, so it’s not entirely clear what form the controls will take. Depending on your profession, you’ll receive a text message telling you that you’re eligible for SESAM Internet Pro, and you’ll need to fill in a personal information form. This form is extremely detailed, which, incidentally, allows for the collection of information and enables the state to carry out genuine intelligence-gathering and surveillance. There are plenty of people who need the internet and who are hesitant, who would rather pay 4,000 euros for a banned Starlink box – bearing in mind that the average monthly wage in Iran is 180 euros – than fill in this form, even if they were entitled to internet access, because they do not know to what extent the Revolutionary Guards will exert the considerable influence they currently wield within the workings of the Islamic Republic.
So for the moment, it’s a bit too early to say. All we know is that the Revolutionary Guards cover all sectors, are skilled strategists, and can find themselves on very different sides. For example, you have Revolutionary Guards who are pro-nuclear deal and others who are anti-nuclear deal because they are enriching themselves through smuggling under the sanctions. So, if you like, they are everywhere and, on certain points, they even oppose one another, which makes it impossible to have a straightforward and obvious understanding of what will happen next.
