Challenges to Expanding the Abraham Accords

Since the signing of the Abraham Accords in 2020 and 2021 between Israel and the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan, no additional countries have joined the framework. At the same time, none of the signatories have withdrawn. The Abraham Accords represent a diplomatic normalization of relations between these states and Israel, marking the first such normalization between Israel and Arab countries since the peace treaties with Egypt in 1979 and Jordan in 1994. The accords also broke with the long-standing Arab consensus that normalization with Israel would only be possible after resolving the Israeli–Palestinian conflict and implementing a two-state solution.

The motivations behind the Abraham Accords differ from those that drove the earlier peace agreements with Egypt and Jordan. The accords were primarily intended to enhance deterrence against the growing threat posed by Iran over the past decade. For Israel, the objective was to reduce its regional isolation, all under U.S. sponsorship, as Washington sought to lessen its security commitments in the Middle East by fostering greater regional cooperation.

This study examines the most significant recent developments related to the Abraham Accords and the prospects for expanding them to include additional countries. It also assesses the key advantages and drawbacks of the accords, the challenges they face, and the possibilities for overcoming those obstacles.

A Shift in Attitudes Toward Israel

Israel and the United States have worked to expand the Abraham Accords to include other countries, most notably Saudi Arabia. However, these negotiations appear to have stalled sharply following the Hamas attack of October 7, 2023. In the aftermath, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his far-right coalition intensified their opposition to the two-state solution and launched a war on the Gaza Strip that has lasted nearly two years. Since then, 1.9 million people have been displaced. According to Gaza’s Ministry of Health, more than 64,500 people have been killed so far, including an estimated 19,000 children.

Israel has also opened multiple regional fronts. In 2024, it responded to sustained attacks by Hezbollah, Iran’s largest proxy militia. Israel has conducted military operations in Syria and engaged in clashes with Houthi rebels in Yemen, who have repeatedly targeted international shipping in the Red Sea and Israeli territory. In June, Israel fought a 12-day war with Iran.

These developments have weakened Iran’s regional position, particularly following the collapse of the Syrian regime, Tehran’s most important ally, thereby reducing the perceived Iranian threat to Arab states. At the same time, Israeli violence and attempts to impose certain conditions on Egypt and Jordan—such as pressuring them to accept migrants from Gaza—along with Israel’s targeting of a Hamas negotiating delegation in Doha, prompted sharp Arab reactions aimed at halting Israeli attacks that no longer spared even U.S. allies.

Following the Doha incident, the United Arab Emirates barred Israeli defense companies from participating in an air show in Dubai, citing security concerns. Emirati officials also criticized Israeli plans to annex large parts of the occupied West Bank, warning that such steps could jeopardize bilateral relations and U.S. efforts to expand the accords.

Although Donald Trump, in his second term, continues to push for additional normalization agreements—particularly with Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, and Syria—no new Arab state has joined the accords since their initial signing five years ago. Meanwhile, Israeli supporters of the accords point to growing regional initiatives and expanding trade with partner countries.

Before October 7, 2023, Israel and the UAE in particular signed several agreements, including a five-year deal in 2022 for knowledge exchange in agriculture. According to Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics, total goods trade between Israel and the UAE reached approximately $3.2 billion in 2024.

Nevertheless, ongoing conflicts in the Middle East appear to be discouraging other regional governments from establishing diplomatic relations with Israel. Saudi Arabia was close to signing an agreement with Israel before the October 7 attacks. Since the subsequent war in Gaza, however, Riyadh has rejected normalization and insisted on serious efforts toward a two-state solution. Given Israel’s military operations in neighboring Syria and Lebanon, it is unlikely that either government will seek full diplomatic relations in the near term. Even so, U.S. officials remain optimistic about the possibility of reaching a security agreement with Syria in 2025.

The Two-State Solution Returns to the Fore

The Abraham Accords constitute a form of diplomatic and economic normalization aimed at breaking the stalemate in Arab–Israeli relations, based on the optimistic assumption that these initiatives would give Arab signatories a more effective role in influencing the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. This has not materialized as hoped. The repercussions of October 7 reverberated across the region, making further progress on normalization more complex. Recent developments have shown that the domestic and strategic interests of key regional actors remain deeply intertwined with the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Many analysts therefore argue that a vision of a fully integrated Middle East cannot be achieved without a practical pathway to resolving the conflict and ensuring a viable Palestinian future.

Recent developments in Gaza have also demonstrated that there are limits to Israel’s disproportionate response. The Gaza war, settler violence in the West Bank, and the legacy of previous wars have all affected public attitudes toward Israel. As such, resolving the future of Palestine is essential to improving relations between Israelis and other Arab societies.

Despite the geopolitical challenges posed by the war, economic engagement remains crucial for encouraging deeper regional integration. Economic ties between Israel and the UAE have endured and shown resilience, with bilateral trade valued at around $3.2 billion. Elsewhere, initiatives such as the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) and the Israeli–Jordanian water-for-energy agreement, known as “Project Prosperity,” represent productive efforts that are central to advancing integration.

Although most of these initiatives have stalled amid the war and subsequent regional instability, planning for their rapid revival once the fighting ends is essential. To achieve this, Israel must demonstrate economic rationality, prioritize competitiveness, and ensure that its infrastructure is capable and attractive enough to link the Middle East with Europe through the economic corridor. The creation of new qualified industrial zones, similar to those between Egypt and Israel, could also encourage greater regional cooperation in economic and security relations.

The current Middle Eastern reality requires Israel to do more to prioritize its relations with Arab states. The Abraham Accords are among the most significant diplomatic achievements of modern times, and preserving them—almost at any cost—is vital to maintaining stability and fostering cooperation across the region. Even a temporary disruption of these alliances would severely undermine strategic partnerships in defense, technology, and trade with the UAE, Bahrain, Egypt, and Jordan.

The U.S. Administration Pushes Forward Despite Challenges

Although the Abraham Accords have been strained during this period, they remain intact, and the Trump administration continues to seek their expansion. The potential inclusion of Central Asian states, particularly Azerbaijan, presents a strategic opportunity for further normalization and integration. Lebanon and Syria are currently in transitional phases, and it remains unclear how their relations with Israel and the United States will evolve. The appearance of President Ahmed al-Sharaa at the UN General Assembly and his extensive diplomatic engagement—including with Saudi and U.S. officials—signals a possible opportunity, eventually, for normalization between Israel and Syria, or at least a state of non-belligerence. At the same time, regional leaders will need to address difficult questions regarding issues such as the status of the Druze community in southern Syria, the disarmament of Hezbollah in Lebanon, the “day after” plan for Gaza, and Iran’s growing influence in Iraq.

In an interview with Time magazine, U.S. President Donald Trump predicted that Saudi Arabia would join the Abraham Accords and normalize relations with Israel by the end of 2025. He said eliminating the Iranian threat had been the cornerstone of the strategy and that other countries would now follow. “I think the Abraham Accords will start to expand very rapidly. I’m very confident of that,” Trump said.

Trump argued that Saudi Arabia and other countries that supported a Gaza ceasefire would not have done so if Iran were still at the height of its power. The Islamic Republic, he said, has moved from threatening the region to “fighting for survival.” The Trump administration appears determined to finish what it started. U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio has also stated that a sustainable end to the war would encourage more countries to join the Abraham Accords.

Yet even as an agreement on Gaza was reached, far-right lawmakers in the Knesset took a highly provocative and symbolic step by giving preliminary approval to a bill that would apply Israeli law to occupied territories—an effective move toward annexation. This step was met with a swift and sharp rebuke from the highest levels of the Trump administration.

From the perspective of Israeli experts, restoring momentum to the Abraham Accords also requires Arab states to acknowledge that Hamas initiated the war on October 7 and to understand Israel’s determination to defeat the group entirely. Israeli analysts note that most Gulf and Arab states, including Bahrain, do not designate Hamas as a terrorist organization. At the same time, Gulf states stand to benefit significantly from Israel’s efforts to decapitate Iran’s Islamist proxies and weaken the Iranian regime itself. Iran continues to pose a threat to Gulf and Arab states through its aggressive military behavior and its declared intent to destabilize the region. For example, Tehran has reportedly attempted to exploit protests in Bahrain against Israel to incite a coup similar to the unrest seen in 2011.

What Positive Outcomes Have Been Achieved So Far?

Today, the Abraham Accords require new understandings or conditions to ensure their durability. This includes linking expanded normalization between Israel and the Arab world to tangible progress in the Israeli–Palestinian process to achieve long-term regional stability. Greater emphasis is also needed on people-to-people engagement and educational initiatives to counter extremism and foster long-term acceptance among the populations of signatory states, alongside sustained interfaith dialogue to build mutual trust.

A second key priority is overcoming challenges through economic and technological cooperation. One example is advancing the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), a planned trade and infrastructure axis connecting India to Europe via the Gulf states, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Israel.

The construction of an electrified railway network in the Jordanian–Israeli–Gaza triangle could further enhance cooperation. This approach aligns with the Trump administration’s plans for Gaza, which focus on economic development, infrastructure investment, and regional integration as pathways to lasting peace. Climate projects are also expected to play a prominent role within the IMEC framework, particularly in light of proposals to more closely involve Syria in such initiatives in the future.

The corridor is well positioned to become an effective regional integration and infrastructure initiative in the coming decades, enhancing supply chain security and aligning with Eurasian policies that promote open, rules-based connectivity supported by market-driven local investment from a diverse group of countries. It also offers an alternative to existing corridors dominated by a single government, particularly China’s Belt and Road Initiative.

Despite these promising projects, the path forward is far from smooth. The IMEC transport corridor, one of the most significant initiatives, faces a funding gap of approximately $5 billion to become even partially operational and connect Gulf ports to Haifa in Israel. The project also confronts a mix of political risks, governance gaps, financing shortfalls, and regulatory and operational complexities.

Among the most significant risks are regional tensions and wars, which deter private investors and subject timelines to volatility. Continued rapprochement and normalization among corridor states—especially with Israel—remain necessary, yet this factor remains uncertain due to ongoing instability, particularly in countries such as Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq.

The Washington-based Abraham Accords Peace Institute describes the signing of the accords as a “fundamental turning point in the nature of relations between Israel and Arab states.” It notes that, with bipartisan support in the United States, four countries embarked within just four months—between August and December 2020—on a diplomatic path to normalize bilateral relations with Israel, following the precedent set by Egypt and Jordan.

The institute argues that the accords “pave the way for ending the Arab–Israeli conflict and open horizons for a future based on peace, tolerance, and equal opportunity in the Middle East and the world.” It views them as “the beginning of a new regional chapter founded on a collective vision of economic prosperity,” adding that as trade relations deepen, ties between peoples and states grow stronger.

According to the institute, the Abraham Accords form a pillar of a “genuine Middle East peace process,” highlighting their tangible benefits for human relations, trade exchange, and joint cooperation. They represent an initiative that seizes a historic opportunity to unlock the region’s latent potential, enhance U.S. security, and help the Middle East move beyond decades of conflict toward a new phase of multilateral cooperation.

The institute estimates that the accords could help create up to four million new jobs and stimulate as much as $1 trillion in economic activity over the next decade.

The accords have also delivered certain benefits to the Arab signatories. The United States has supported Emirati and Bahraini concerns regarding Iran. Until 1969, for example, Tehran claimed that Bahrain was an integral part of its territory, and Bahraini rulers continue to view segments of the country’s uneasy Shiite majority as a potential fifth column loyal to Iran.

The accords also strengthen the regional alliance against Iran. Israelis, in turn, place great hopes in the Abraham Accords for deepening future relations with Gulf states that are geographically distant from the epicenter of the conflict in the occupied Palestinian territories. While some see the accords as an opportunity for peace and development, as officially stated, their ultimate fate depends on their ability to meaningfully address unresolved issues—chief among them the Palestinian cause, which remains the core of the Middle East conflict.

The Trump administration has strongly resisted moves by Israeli politicians to annex the West Bank, viewing such actions as a direct threat to the broader peace process. This resistance reflects one of the key benefits of the Abraham Accords, as both Israel and the United States fear that Arab states could withdraw from the agreements, dealing a blow to U.S. efforts to de-escalate Middle Eastern conflicts in order to focus more on confronting China and Russia.

Does Israel Want to Preserve the Accords?

Israel is increasingly aware of shifting global attitudes toward it. In an effort to persuade Prime Minister Netanyahu to agree to a ceasefire plan, Trump reportedly said: “Bibi, you can’t fight the world. You can fight individual battles, but the world is against you. And Israel is a very small place compared to the world.”

A growing number of voices are warning of the risks of Israel continuing its expansionist policies and reliance on military force to impose its will, arguing that this approach will not serve it in the long run. Analysts note that Israel has historically survived thanks to its technological and economic advantages. But if the world turns against it, as many argue it already has, Israel will not be able to sustain those advantages. Countries would eventually stop trading with Israel, and Jewish emigration would begin—starting with the country’s most talented and capable citizens. As a result, the dream of a Jewish state would falter in the absence of flexibility.

Bringing Saudi Arabia into the accords would be one of Trump’s greatest potential achievements, and Israel also seeks this outcome. Under current conditions, however, there is little to compel Saudi Arabia to abandon its insistence on resolving the Palestinian issue on the basis of a two-state solution. Iran is now in a weakened position and no longer poses a major threat to Riyadh, which has pursued de-escalation with Tehran through Iraqi and Chinese mediation since 2023. Saudi Arabia has also worked to improve relations with Turkey and strengthen military and political cooperation with Pakistan, signaling a strategy of balancing U.S.–Israeli arrangements with independent regional frameworks that reduce escalation.

This equation gives Saudi Arabia greater leverage to impose its conditions. By contrast, Netanyahu finds himself forced to juggle competing pressures: reconciling U.S. demands and Israel’s strategic interests on one hand, while appeasing far-right partners on the other, who continue to argue that Israel has an opportunity to expand and impose its will by force despite repeated warnings of the dangers inherent in such a course.

Conclusions

• The accords signed since 2020 have endured without new Arab states joining and without any signatories withdrawing. However, momentum for expansion declined sharply after October 7, 2023, amid widening battlefronts and rising humanitarian and political costs of the war.
• The motivations behind the new accords differed from those of Israel’s earlier agreements with Egypt and Jordan, focusing on deterring Iran and breaking Israel’s isolation. Saudi Arabia, however, linked normalization to serious progress toward a two-state solution, leaving expansion contingent on the Palestinian issue.
• Economically, benefits between Israel and the UAE have continued, with trade reaching about $3.2 billion in 2024. Yet tensions have manifested on the ground and diplomatically—such as restrictions on Israeli defense firms and criticism of annexation—threatening sustainability if escalation continues.
• Israeli steps toward annexation and the expansion of military activity in Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, and Iran risk undermining other states’ willingness to normalize in the near term, despite U.S. efforts to revive the process through regional security frameworks.
• Major integration projects such as IMEC are promising but face funding gaps, geopolitical risks, and governance and coordination challenges, making renewed normalization dependent on regional de-escalation and tangible progress on the Palestinian track.

Sources:

• Washington Institute, October 3, 2025
• Jewish News Syndicate, October 24, 2025
• Press TV, October 28, 2025
• Atlantic Council, August 27, 2025
• European Leadership Network
• ELNET Germany, October 20, 2025