It appears that Iran has come to realize that its influence has significantly diminished in the Middle East. In the best-case scenarios, Tehran needs many years to repair its troubled relationships with the active states in the region. This comes after the decline in the power of Hezbollah, its most important ally in Lebanon, the fall of the Assad regime—which was its ally and the link between Tehran and Beirut—as well as the weakening of the Houthis in Yemen under the impact of American and Israeli strikes, in addition to the pressures facing Shiite militias in Iraq.
This retreat has been accompanied by diplomatic progress and diligent efforts to strengthen Iran’s position in Central Asia. This is evident from the visits of Iranian officials to Central Asian countries and Afghanistan, particularly the visit of Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian to Tajikistan, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi to Afghanistan, and the strengthening of relations with Turkmenistan. These mark the beginning of active diplomatic movements by Iran to enhance its relations with Central Asian countries, which hold great strategic importance for Iran, especially since they are part of China’s “Belt and Road” project. These countries have promising markets for Iranian goods, and Iran is attempting to connect these landlocked countries to the Sea of Oman via railways, presenting itself as a transit route for goods.
Central Asia is considered a bridge connecting Iran to the rest of the Eastern world, playing a vital role in economic and security fields.
What facilitates Iran’s mission in the region is its important location, as well as its cultural and religious extensions in the area. Iran is already a member of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), which is an international governmental economic organization comprising five main countries: Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Armenia, and Kyrgyzstan. The union aims to create a common market for goods, services, capital, and labor.
Tehran also seeks to limit the impact of Western sanctions by strengthening its economic relations with Central Asian countries, the Caucasus, and Russia.
Transportation… Iran’s Gateway to Entry
The main focus of Iran’s regional interaction is on developing trade and logistical transport links. This aligns with Iran’s “Look East” strategy, aimed at alleviating Tehran’s economic isolation.
So far, Iranian efforts have not yielded much fruit due to American sanctions, which pose a major obstacle. The total volume of mutual trade remains relatively low, slightly exceeding $1.5 billion, although this figure has seen slight growth in recent years. Iran aims to quadruple its trade volume with Uzbekistan to reach $2 billion, increase trade with Kazakhstan and Tajikistan to $1 billion each, and boost trade with Turkmenistan by 30%.
At the same time, Central Asian countries are seeking new consumer markets and more effective links with major global economies. Iran combines these two qualities, making it a valuable partner for the region. Iran has a network of roads and railways, along with its main ports in the Indian Ocean, giving it an advantage in cooperating with landlocked Central Asian republics. Tehran plays a pivotal role in the Eurasian land bridge that connects China to Europe via railways.
Many east-west land transport routes pass through Iran, which also include Central Asian countries. The railway corridor between China, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Iran, Turkey, and the European Union is being actively developed, as is the parallel multimodal transport route between China, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Iran, Turkey, and the European Union.
Crossing Central Asia is of utmost importance to Iran, given the redirection of its foreign trade eastward. The comprehensive free trade agreement between the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) countries and Iran entered into force on May 15, 2025, providing for sharp reductions in customs duties on most goods.
Russia, the dominant economy in the Eurasian Economic Union with a massive trade turnover with Iran ($4.8 billion in 2024), will benefit more than others from the free trade agreement. However, China remains Tehran’s largest trading partner in the East. The value of non-oil bilateral trade reached $34.1 billion in the past Iranian calendar year, which ended on March 20, 2025. The development of transport corridors through Central Asia is expected to remain a key issue in Chinese-Iranian relations and an area of increasing interest in the future.
On the other hand, Iran has sought over the past years to join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization as part of its “Look East” strategy as an alternative to opening up to the West, especially amid Western sanctions. This membership reflects a significant shift in Tehran’s policy toward Central Asia, where it now seeks integration into the Eurasian security and economic system, after its previous participation in the organization was limited and marginal. Accepting the Eurasian identity reflects Iran’s desire to cooperate with Central Asian countries to build closer political, economic, and security relations. Tehran also seeks to leverage its geographic position in projects like the North-South Corridor and Chabahar Port to enhance trade connectivity with these countries, in addition to employing its cultural ties to deepen relations. Regional developments, particularly the West’s withdrawal from Afghanistan, are also pushing it toward greater coordination with Central Asian countries in combating terrorism. However, this new orientation is fraught with challenges related to geopolitical differences among the organization’s members and sanctions that hinder full economic cooperation, as there are disputes between member states (for example: tensions between China and India, India and Pakistan), making it difficult to build a unified strategy. This requires Iran to maintain a balanced stance toward these disputes to preserve its relations with various parties in Central Asia.
Railways: The Key to Iran’s Success
On May 25, 2025, the first freight train from Xi’an in China arrived at the dry port of Abrin in Iran, officially launching a direct railway line between the two countries. This new logistical artery significantly reduces transit times (from 30-40 days by sea to about 15 days by land), directly impacting transportation costs. The railway line enhances Tehran’s integration into the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and allows Central Asian countries access to Iranian ports on international waters. The increasing economic and logistical integration of Tehran into the Eurasian network may undermine Western efforts to isolate it.
It is worth noting that a dry port is an inland multimodal terminal directly connected by road or rail to a seaport, serving as a center for reloading sea cargo to inland destinations. As a result, Chinese shipments transported via the new railway line can effectively reach international sea routes. The railway line is part of the broader East-West corridor (still under integration), which aims to connect China to Iran, the Arabian Gulf, Africa, and ultimately Europe.
The benefits of this new infrastructure are not limited to the commercial aspect; this route also bypasses fragile maritime straits and chokepoints often guarded by entities hostile to China and Iran, providing Tehran and Beijing with a potential tool to circumvent sanctions imposed by the United States and the European Union. Furthermore, the railway line represents a flexible alternative to disputed maritime chokepoints. As evident from the recent 250% increase in shipping costs due to instability in the Red Sea, major maritime chokepoints like the Suez Canal, the Strait of Malacca, and the Strait of Hormuz are highly volatile and can disrupt global trade flows at times.
This comes at a time when China, which previously invested heavily in corridors and ports across Pakistan, is now paying greater attention to the Islamic Republic, whose internal situation is seen as less prone to security challenges and more stable. However, Tehran must cautiously navigate the implications of the ongoing competition between Beijing and New Delhi.
Are the Winds Blowing in Iran’s Favor?
With Western attention shifting away from Central Asia and Russia’s dominance weakening under sanctions and war, Iran is steadily working to establish itself as a vital link in the region’s trade and transport networks. Tehran’s orientation toward Central Asian countries comes at a promising moment. The five Central Asian republics—Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan—are increasingly seeking alternatives to traditional transport routes that linked them to Moscow or made them dependent on Chinese infrastructure.
Iran offers an attractive option, serving as a gateway to the Arabian Gulf and the Indian Ocean, with access to European markets via Turkey, and industrial and technological partnerships that diversify the region’s economic relations. Recent months have seen a wave of high-level diplomatic exchanges, with Iranian officials visiting Dushanbe, Tashkent, and Astana, while Central Asian leaders reciprocated with official visits to Tehran, confirming the depth of the political dimension of these relations.
Analysts point out that Tehran’s Eastern partnerships are still largely based on trade dealings, driven by pragmatic opportunism rather than ideological solidarity or permanent alliances. The Iranian leadership views relations with China and Russia as a hedge against American pressures, not as enduring alliances.
This realism supports Tehran’s cautious rapprochement with Central Asia. While Chinese investment remains dominant in many sectors, Central Asian countries are wary of excessive dependence on Beijing and are keen to diversify their economic relations. Iran presents itself as a reliable and geographically logical alternative.
Until recently, Iran’s economic presence in the region was modest, but it is changing rapidly. In 2022, trade volume between Iran and Kazakhstan exceeded $500 million, with both sides targeting $1 billion and potentially reaching $3 billion. Trade with Tajikistan reached nearly $380 million, supported by joint projects in energy, pharmaceuticals, and engineering. These figures are increasing as Tehran seeks to deepen relations.
Kyrgyzstan also finds its strengths in transportation through Iran. The Iran-Turkmenistan-Uzbekistan-Kyrgyzstan route operates within the Southern Transport Corridor. The railway line extends from Bandar Abbas Port to the city of Osh. Over nine months in 2023, more than 33,000 tons of goods were transported in this direction. The parties are studying the launch of a pilot container train between Iran and Kyrgyzstan. Meanwhile, Bishkek hopes to reach Turkey’s borders via Iranian routes. For this purpose, work is underway to establish a multimodal corridor between Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Iran, and Turkey.
In addition to the transportation sector, Iran is working to strengthen its industrial partnerships. Iranian companies are seeking joint projects in energy technology, pharmaceuticals, water management, construction, and agriculture. These projects not only generate revenue but also enhance dependence on supply chains, giving Tehran additional tools of influence.
Iran’s ambitions are not limited to the economic aspect alone. In areas like Tajikistan, Iran-supported cultural and religious initiatives have already begun, raising concerns in some Western and regional circles about Tehran’s ability to build proxy networks. Iran’s track record in the Middle East—where it used similar methods to shape policy in Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen—suggests it may employ the same tactics in Central Asia if given the opportunity.
The risks are significant. The more Central Asian trade depends on Iranian corridors and infrastructure, the greater Tehran’s influence on the region’s foreign policy. This could affect voting patterns in international forums, participation in sanctions regimes, and regional alliances.
Iran’s increasing engagement in Central Asia is not coincidental but reflects a calculated strategy to exploit power vacuums and transform the Islamic Republic into a pivotal player in the region’s economic and political landscape. In a world where Russia is distracted and Western influence is fading, Tehran’s growing role in Central Asia deserves significant attention—not only from regional governments but from global powers still hoping to shape the future of Eurasian trade and diplomacy.
Tajikistan: Iran’s “Achilles’ Heel”
Tajikistan—the only Persian-speaking country in the region—looks to Iran as a potential strategic partner. Dushanbe seeks to significantly enhance its bilateral relations with Tehran, hoping this step will have a positive impact on its economy. Tajikistan and Iran have notably strengthened their bilateral relations by signing 23 memoranda of understanding in sectors such as trade, energy, infrastructure, cultural exchange, and security.
For Dushanbe, it is essential to secure the necessary funding to complete the Rogun Hydroelectric Power Plant and the Independence Tunnel (also known as the Anzob Tunnel), where the Iranian company Farab is involved in its construction, in addition to several small and medium-sized projects. For Tehran, the economic aspect of cooperation with Tajikistan is undoubtedly of great importance, although it has other ambitions in this Central Asian country.
According to analysts, Iran’s primary interest in Tajikistan relates to cultural and religious ties, as it considers the country part of its Persian-Iranian civilization. Maintaining a good political relationship with Dushanbe enables the Islamic Republic to significantly strengthen these cultural ties. The religious aspect also plays an important role in Tajik-Iranian relations. Although Tajikistan is a secular state, the post-Soviet era has seen a noticeable increase in religious practices, with Sunni Muslims constituting about 95% of the population.
The number of Twelver Shiites in Tajikistan is small, but there are Shiites from various sects, whom Iran considers a potential audience for its ideology. It appears that the Islamic Republic fears Tajikistan becoming “fertile ground for takfiri thought” and exporting it to neighboring Afghanistan, and thence to Iran. Therefore, Tehran believes that strengthening security cooperation with Tajikistan enables it to thwart such a project.
By highlighting language, cultural heritage, and tangible economic development, Iran may gain local legitimacy and popular support. For the Iranian government, strengthening relations with a culturally close and Persian-speaking country like Tajikistan can serve as a strategic and symbolic reevaluation of its foreign policy. In addition to diversifying its regional partnerships, such a move can help align Iran’s external engagement with the preferences of a large segment of its domestic population, who increasingly criticize the costly commitments to proxy groups in Arab countries.
Challenges to Iran’s New Role
So far, Iran’s growing influence in the region is limited to the economic aspect, but this may allow the Islamic Republic to spread its ideological message, something that governments in West Asia and Central Asia fear, though some opposition groups welcome it. Some Western observers warn that Tehran will likely exploit its newly discovered economic influence in the region to promote the regime’s Islamic message.
Central Asian countries are typically viewed as tools manipulated by external powers. In response, these countries have sought to develop relations with multiple partners to avoid dominance by any one. Many in the West initially saw this as competition between Turkey and Iran, whose differing ideological and political positions led the West to support the former and oppose the latter. Attention then shifted to the geopolitical competition between Russia, China, and the West, while Iran gains a new foothold in the region with support from Moscow, especially among opposition groups.
Iran faces several challenges that hinder its ambitions to enhance its influence in Central Asia, particularly with strong competition among regional and international powers in this area. For this reason, these powers have developed diverse strategies to support their interests through major projects such as the Eurasian Economic Union, the New Silk Road, the Greater Central Asia Initiative, the “One Belt, One Road” project, the “TAPI” gas pipeline project, and the North-South Corridor. While these projects may offer opportunities for Iran, they also pose challenges that could affect its interests.
Economically, Iran seeks to strengthen its relations with Central Asian countries, but these countries deal with it cautiously due to the instability in Tehran’s foreign relations, especially with Russia’s declining role in the region. There is also the possibility of disputes between Iran and China over infrastructure projects, which could further complicate the scene. Additionally, Russia is trying to protect its influence in the energy market by limiting Iran’s opportunities to export gas and oil. Meanwhile, India, with American support, is promoting projects aimed at reducing the region’s dependence on Iranian energy, such as the “TAPI” pipeline project. The failure of the Peace Pipeline project between Iran, Pakistan, and India has increased the difficulty of Tehran’s position and opened the door to alternatives supported by major powers.
On the regional level, Iran seeks gains without entering direct conflicts, but it faces increasing competition. Turkey, for example, is enhancing its cultural, economic, and military influence in Central Asia, benefiting from linguistic and cultural ties with Turkic-speaking countries. This Turkish move, such as supplying Kyrgyzstan with Bayraktar drones, strengthens Ankara’s role as an influential power and limits Iran’s ability to expand its influence.
As for Israel, in cooperation with the United States, it relies on diplomatic and economic tools to isolate Iran. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Tel Aviv has worked to strengthen its relations with Central Asian countries, particularly in defense, intelligence, technology, and agriculture. These moves aim to reduce these countries’ dependence on Iran, complicating Tehran’s efforts to build strong relations in the region.
Iran itself has become a frequent target of Israel, with many indicators showing the weakness of the Iranian regime against Israeli attacks, revealing significant security breaches even in tight circles. This turns Iran into an unsafe area as a transit for goods and a transportation hub between China and Europe, which seems to be a shared goal for both the United States and Israel, serving to encourage competing transport projects supported by Israel and the United States.
Conclusions
- Iran is witnessing a noticeable decline in its influence in the Middle East, especially after the weakening of its allies such as Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Shiite militias in Iraq, and the fall of the Assad regime as a strategic link. This decline has pushed Tehran to redirect its strategy eastward toward Central Asia to compensate for its geopolitical losses and expand its influence in less politically turbulent areas.
- Railway lines and logistical corridors are the cornerstone of Iran’s strategy to enhance its regional role. Projects like the railway line between China and Iran, and the multimodal corridor connecting Central Asia to Turkey and Europe, enable Tehran to present itself as a vital link in global trade, granting it significant economic and political influence, especially over landlocked countries like Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.
- Iranian engagement with Central Asian countries is primarily built on mutual economic interests, not religious or ideological alliances. Iran seeks to leverage its geographic position and transport networks to become a pivotal trading partner, while Central Asian countries look for alternatives to Russian and Chinese infrastructure. However, Iran’s impact remains limited compared to Chinese or Turkish investments.
- Tajikistan plays a unique role in Iranian policy due to cultural, linguistic, and religious ties with Iran, as it is the only Persian-speaking country in Central Asia. Iran seeks to exploit these commonalities to build soft power through economic, cultural, and religious projects. Tajikistan has become a symbolic tool for rehabilitating Iran’s external image and expanding its cultural influence in the region.
- Despite Iran’s intensive moves, Tehran faces enormous challenges: from increasing Turkish competition, to Israeli and American influence, Western sanctions, and rivalry with Russia and China over infrastructure and energy influence. Additionally, repeated security breaches within Iran weaken its attractiveness as a reliable partner in major logistical projects. This complicates its mission and limits its ability to play an undisputed pivotal role in Central Asia.
