Kurds in Iran, from Battle of Damdam Castle to Mullah’s Regime, Eastern Kurdistan

Generally speaking, “Kurds” as the name refers to “stateless people” is a deeply originated statement in the imagination of public in the region. Kurds are ancient peoples in the region, and distributed mainly in four countries, namely, Iraq, Turkey, Iran and Syria. The Kurds, according to many historical sources, are considered to be the peoples of Indo– European origins who descended from the Midian Tribes that settled in Persia, and established an empire in the 7th century B.C.

Muhammad Amin Zaki (1880-1948) is Kurdish historian who is considered by Kurds as one of their most important historical references. In his book “Synopsis of The History of The Kurds and Kurdistan” states:” There are two classes of Kurds, the first class believes that they inhabited Kurdistan, and he names them “Zagros Mountain Peoples “The peoples of Lulu, Koti, Corti, Goethe, Judy, Kasai, Subari, Khalidi, Mitani, Hori or Huri and Nairi are the very old origin of the Kurdish peoples. The second class: is the Indo -European peoples who emigrated in the tenth century B.C., and they were Medians and the Kordukhien who melted with the indigenous peoples, and composed the Kurd nation.   

The Greek historian Xenophon (335-427 B.C.) described them in his writings as “Mighty Warriors” who inhibited mountainous regions. He called them “Cardoch”, an old Greek word that consisted of two syllables (card with the plural suffix V), who attacked The Greek army when it was crossing to the region in 400 B.C. The region, according to Xenophon, is located near southeastern lake in eastern Turkey.  

Other historians, on the other hand, like Muhammad Amin Zaki considered Kordukhiens as Indo-European peoples who later combined with the Kurds who are rooted back to the peoples of Zagros mountains. Anyway, those peoples were not originally Europeans.      

On the other hand, the Russian orientalist Minorsky states that the Kurdish nation was homogenously composed of two tribes, the Mardonite and the Kertiobi who spoke the same lively similar dialects. As they headed towards the west, many other races combined with them.

Mark Sykes, in his book “Armenia” stated that: “We can say that the current Persians, Kurds, Armenians and even the remaining Turks were remnants of the peoples of those ancient kingdoms.     

In the context of searching the origin of the Kurds and their geographical, demographical and religious distribution, we can say that they are religiously distributed into a Sunni Muslims majority, non-Muslim minorities and political parties, mostly secular, but they are geographically distributed in an area of more than 500.000 S. Km. Zoroastrianism is the oldest religion of the Kurds and most of the Aryan peoples’ in the Middle East.        

The population census of Kurds varies according to many sources, and it ranges between 25 – 35 million according to sources close to the four countries, and the population census are 50 million according to relatively neutral sources. Larger numbers are given by supremely native Kurdish. However, the largest number in Turkey ranges between 15 – 20 million that nearly constitutes %20 of the total population. In Iran there are nearly 9 million that nearly constitutes %10 – %15 of the total population. As for Iraq, there are 5 – 6 million which constitutes %15 – %20 of the total population. The least number is in Syria where there are more than 3.5 million, which constitutes %15 of the total population.    

Being blocked in closed mountainous areas and far away from seaports, Kurds preserved their language with its various dialects, their customs and traditions, and their community discipline that was mainly based on tribal system. However, it was a demerit for them to be isolated from foreign cultures for a long time, and this hindered their cultural and intellectual development.  

In addition to the main four countries, large numbers of Kurds live in Azerbaijan, Armenia, Lebanon and Europe.

At the beginning of the 20th century, Kurds gasped to establish a Kurdish independent state called Kurdistan. After the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in World War I, the western victorious allies figured out a vision of a Kurdish state in Treaty of Sèvres Treaty in 1920.  

But their dream evaporated after the victory of Mustafa Kamal Ataturk, and the Allies were forced to retreat from Severe Treaty. The treaty was replaced by Lausanne Treaty in 1923 by which the Kurdish people were under the control of Turkey and Iran, and Iraq and Syria were under the British and French mandates respectively.   

After their dream of an independent state proved to be mere imagination, Kurd’s long-term predicament was caused by the countries that shared their land (Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria). These four countries crushed them through direct communal punishment in various ways military, political, economic, cultural and social, or through campaigns of Turkification, Persianization and Arabization respectively that were practiced by the religious and national governments of these countries. With the process of time, national movements began to emerge in each part of the four countries according to existing factors and surrounding situation in the country in which a part was located. But each part was gasping to establish a Kurdish entity or autonomy that will preserve their identity, and protect them from the evils of political centers represented by the capitals of those four states.

Although each of these movements that popped out in the four countries ran through many stages such as revolutionary, idle and conciliatory, the earliest and the most active movement, the Kurdish Political Movement in Iran, could not obtain its rights during the last decade. It has not obtained its rights to shed light on its political and military activities in the most powerful country in the Middle East i.e. Iran.  Attention began to be gradually paid to this movement as a result of the return of the Iranian file to international forums which are dissatisfied with Iran’s suspicious interferences in the region.

Iran’s Kurdistan or Eastern Kurdistan

Iran is encompassing an estimate of %16 – 25 of the total Kurds around the world which means about %10 – %15 of the Iranian population.

The Kurds in Iran are divided into many ethnic tribal classifications as follows:

The Sunni Kurds, the Lakers, the Bakhtariyans, the Chalhir and the Luks who are inhibiting in the northern regions of the country. They are concentrated in a number of provinces such as Western Azerbaijan, Uromia, Ilam, Kurdistan, Kermanshah which is the largest, Sanadaj and Lourstan provinces. These provinces stretch on an area of 175.000 square kilometers.      

There are also several national, religious and ethnic components in Eastern Kurdistan and both Sunni and Shiite Muslim sects. In addition, there are Zoroastrians and Jarsan Muslims. Thus, Muslims constitute the majority of the Iranian population. There are also some minorities inhibiting the cities of Eastern Kurdistan (occupied Kurdistan) like Turks, Persians and Azeris.

Today, the Kurds have a special strategic situation. They, to a great extent, enjoy a high degree of political awareness and a high capability of organization and mobilization. They form the second largest Kurdish settlement in the region and the third largest ethnic group in Iran. They inhibit areas rich in natural resources and arable fertile lands. They have routes and land crossings for trade in the Middle East and Central Asia. However, their demographic mass is relatively lower than it is in other countries. Unlike ethnic duality that was observed in other countries between Kurds and Arabs or between Turks and Kurds, Iran contains a more complex and interrelated blend that consists of other six nationalities and other different minorities. However, The Kurds in Iran are facing a central authority based on a tradition that is older than the domination and sovereignty of the state, an authority consolidated by nationality that combines Persian language with Shiite religion. Most of the Kurds in Iran belong to the Sunni sect although the religious factor is not crucial in politics for the Kurds of Iran as observed in the national awakening of Shiite Kurds centered in Ilam and Karmanshah during the past years.    

The Kurdish Political Movement in Iran:

The Kurdish existence in Iran is quite ancient, and it is associated with the Iranian imperial past. The Kurdish existence has been constituting an influential force in the region since the first century B.C., and this existence continued in later stages of history.

The Kurds were a part of the Ottoman-Safavid rivalry millstone in the region. They were not far away from spillovers of that millstone, as most of those rivalries between the two empires took place on their land. As a result, Shah Ismail, who desired to distinguish himself from The Ottoman, and to release himself from the circle of Sunni sect influence that was embodied by rival Ottoman Caliphate, embraced the Shiite sect as the official religion of the alleged state. Thus, the sectarian issue has been made an ideological doctrine since then. In this regard, the remarkable existence of Shiite followers could not be denied in Iran before that, especially among various national groups, particularly Persians. However, authorities’ official commitments provided major prerogatives to spread the doctrine, and to turn it into a dominant feature in Iran, downgrading other sects and religions in return.             

As for the Kurds, they, due to their geographical border location and to their tribal links, remained bound to their Sunni kinsmen in the Ottoman territories, whereas a large number of Khorasan’s Kurds, who were forcibly displaced from their original homelands   converted into Shiite sect, and the Kurds of Kermanshah were mostly followers of the same doctrine.      

As the borders were sub-totally demarcated under the treaty of Shirin Palace in 1639 between the two empires, more than 100 years after the battle of Jaldiran in 1541, the separative phase between the two stages witnessed some kind of sort of stability, and other stages that witnessed strives and conflicts. The situation had been semi-stabilized since the treaty was concluded despite some strong hidden conflicts and constant rivalries at various levels.     

After that, the Kurdish situation in Iran went through stages of idleness and oblivion. It also passed through stages that generated political activities against Iranian-Persian rule according to the stages in which those activities emerged. Some of the highlights of the Kurdish political movements in Iran can be recalled as follows:

The Battle of Dumdum Castle

The battle of Dumdum, which the Kurds call the “Epic of Dumdum”, was one of the most distinctive and important battle. It was historically documented by the Kurds. The battle took place between 1609 and 1610 near an area of Aromiya lake under the leadership of Prince Khan Bin Jahazirin, whereas the Persians were led by Hatem Bek.

The Uprising of Ismail Agha Shkaki (SMKO) Agha Bin Muhammad Basha Bin Ali Khan:

The Kurdish chieftain (SMKO) rebelled against the Iranian rule to obtain independence for Kurdistan, and to restore the rights of its people between 1920 – 1930 A.D. In September 1930, The Iranian government persuaded him with negotiations, but they made an ambush, and assassinated him treacherously in Shenno city.  

The Republic of Mahabad (The First Kurdish Republic)

It was founded on Jan. 22th 1946 in Eastern Kurdistan under the leadership of Mr. Qazi Muhammad who became an iconic symbol for people throughout Kurdistan. The city of Mahabad was nominated the capital of the newly-born state. This state prevailed more than 11 months, then this young republic was terminated by an international conspiracy, and by the pressure of Iran’s Shah on the United States of America that in turn practiced pressure on the former Soviet Union supporting the alleged state at that time. The transaction guaranteed the withdrawal of the Soviet forces from the Iranian territories. The Iranian government overthrew the Kurdish Republic eleven months after it had been declared, and Mr. Qazi Muhammad and three of his assistants were executed on March 3th 1947 in Jawarjra Square in the city of Mahabad.     

Eastern Kurdistan After the Iranian Islamic Revolution

Since the first year of the new foundation of the so-called Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979, the Kurds have encountered with the new regime, and they expressed their dissatisfaction and consent, because the Kurdish people representatives had not got an opportunity to take part in figuring out the new Iranian constitution. The armed struggle of the Kurdish people continued till the year 1983. Then Iranian Revolutionary Guards Forces, known as Albasdiran, attacked the Kurdish areas and the campaign resulted in martyrdom of a number of the old, women and children amid resistance of Peshmerga of Eastern Kurdistan with very unparalleled warfare and unstable conditions. Resistance continued for more than three years, and the Iranian government regained control over parts of Eastern Kurdistan. The Revolutionary Guards practiced the most suppressive actions like arrests and executions. The Revolutionary Guards also destroyed more than 271 Kurdish villages, according Kurdish sources.    

Generally speaking, the map of the Kurdish parties in Iran’s Kurdistan in the current decade can be summarized as follows:

The Kurdistan Democratic Party of Kurdistan (PDKI)

The party was founded in 1945 in the Iranian city of Mahabad, and it aimed at collecting the national Kurdish rights through an Iranian federal democratic republic.

Although the party fought alongside with Islamic and Marxist movements in the Islamic Revolution, the Iranian regime of the Islamic Revolution under the leadership of the Ayatollah Khamenei betrayed the Kurdish demands, and suppressed the party and all other Kurdish parties, and the party was obliged to practice its activities abroad. However, party cells are now existing in the region.

Association of Revolutionary Laborers of Iranian Kurdistan (Kumla)

It is a political nationalist leftist party in Iran and Iraqi Kurdistan. Its nationalists were active in the 1980s and 1990s until they were forced to put their arms down after a fierce resistance of the Iraqi Kurdish forces. Those nationalists founded their society in 1967, and they represent the Kurdish wing of the “Iranian Communist Party”.

“Pajak” (which is a Kurdish word that means free life) is a Kurdish leftist party, and it demonstrates itself as the representative of The Kurds in Iran. It was established as a military force in 2004 in the areas of PKK in Qandil mountains far north of Iraq along the Western Iranian provinces that constitute Kurdish majority. The party considers Iran’s Kurdistan its “struggle arena”.  According a number of sources, it has the strongest dominion in the region of Uromia, Kermanj – speaking Kurds. The party also began to root among young generation, taking advantage of victories achieved by its ally, Units of protection of Kurdish people in Syria.

Kurdistan Freedom Party (PAK)

The party was founded in 1991, and it aimed at establishing a federal Iranian federal democratic Republic. The party is active in both Iran’s and Iraq’s Kurdistan. Its members are part of Peshmerga, and they are fighting alongside with Kurdish forces against the Islamic state in Iraq and Sham ISIS. In April 2016, they attacked the Iranian security forces, and ceasefire was disrupted, so armed conflict was resumed. 

All these parties, factions and other powers are regionally and internationally intertwined with various relations and links with both allying and conflicting aspects. There has been a lot of conflicts among them since the beginning of 20th  century in the struggle of the Kurds and their continued fight to achieve what they call “Kurdistan” in the regions where they used to exist.  

Although the political Kurdish entities mentioned in this article are floating on the surface, but the talk about cultural, political and social conglomerations within the Kurdish community in Iran is an argument-stimulating issue of young generations. Despite media’s restrictions in the region, there has been some kind of mobility like popular rallies that emerged during strikes that resulted from abusive practices against the Kurds in several Kurdish cities. The entire world witnessed how the Kurdish cities turned into masses of movements and demonstrations without a clear impact of the political parties mentioned above. Those movements were motivated by Kurdish national identity with the suicide of the Kurdish girl after being harassed by an Iranian security member in the middle of Mahabad city.  

Such an incident, which is being constantly commemorated shows that the popular movements in the Kurdish areas of Iran move more consciously than it is thought to have been done by political parties. This means that the public awareness of opposition is higher than that of traditional political parties.

Reasons for The Iranian Attack on the Parties located Deep in the Region

The Iranian strike on 14 Saturday morning on 8th September 2018 on the headquarters of the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran caused the death and injury of more than 55 people. It was an unexpected aggression and abnormal act by the Iranian side towards Iraqi Kurdistan region.   

The attack on Kuya (Kuesengk), which had a great echo in the Kurdish arenas in Iran and Iraq was not coincidental. It was an attack that targeted a meeting of opponents to the Islamic regime in Iran as much as it contained within its multiple motives that led Iran to take action as reckless as the above-mentioned. The reasons that led Iran to do that were many, and they can be outlined as follows:    

First:

It is a general demonstration of force by Iran, which has been suffering from the spillovers and consequences of political and economic pressures imposed by the United States of America. This began after the new Republican Party of The United States of America, led by US president, Donald Trump, which has devoted much attention to curb Iran’s power in the region, and it was an attempt of Iran to change apparent aspects of weakness.

Second:

Iranian has been intimidating Kurdish parties opposing Iran that may change into allies to forces opposing Iran in the region. This intimidation of Iran’s reckless behavior comes almost from information Iran has obtained that some Kurdish political entities will become a pioneer force in curbing the Iranian project overseas, as those opposing forces have had a long history of conflict with the governments of Tehran.

Third:

It is an attempt to urge the government of Iraq’s Kurdistan to come closer to Iraqi parties and groups that are closer to Iran after the formation of the new Iraqi cabinet has become a part of the current Iranian-Gulf-Western conflict. The attack was almost a reply to the Iraqi Kurdish forces which rejected to affiliate with the Iranian axis. Those forces that cooperate with the West more than they do with Tehran. 

Fourth:

Iran has been attempting to distract anger of Iranians away from the deteriorated economic situation in the country and focus on regional issues. To consolidate the concept of conspiracy to escape from the massive demonstrations that broke up from the far east to the far west in the country after the Iranian politicians had failed to provide solutions to the deteriorated economic situation and the prevailing corruption state disseminating throughout the country.    

Fifth:

Iran has been attempting to convey messages to the United States of America that Iran can access to the American Soldiers in Iraq through showing off Iranian missiles’ arsenal, and through recent attacks that have been launched on Deir Al-Zour in Syria.  

Sixth:

Iran continually attempts to consolidate its rapprochement with Turkey which is launching air raids against PKK fighters in the Iraqi-Iranian-Turkish borders triangle, and to remind Turkey with a common enemy represented by Kurdish politico–military forces in the region. It is also a concept of consolidating the process of regional cooperation Turkish and Iraqi to confront the Kurdish ambition in the region. It is an attempt to strengthen the Turkish–Iranian relations after the American–Turkish cool relations, and the Russian–Turkish-Iran rapprochement, for there are many files of common interest, and the most important is the Kurdish one in the region, the Syrian, economic and gas-related files. 

Seventh:

Iran intimidates the people of Kurdistan to practice pressure on their local leaders to inhibit any future activities of the Kurdish forces against Tehran in the near future, that apparently has proved to achieve no fruitful results as the anger of peoples of Kurdistan is growing dramatically towards Tehran because these peoples consider Iran’s behavior as a violation of the sanctity of the tranquil region in general.  

Eighth:

Iran has been attempting to stop the activities of Iranian Kurdish parties, especially the Iranian Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Kurdistan Freedom Party that started to carry out military operations against the Iranian Revolutionary Guards in the previous period, and with the emerging of news about a coming mobility of the Kurdish military forces against Tehran.

Tehran fired 8 missiles on Sept. 8th onto an opposition Kurdish group called (HADK) in Iraq’s Kurdistan. The Attack killed 15 people. Anger grew towards the religious authority after the judicial authorities had executed three Kurdish opposing figures. Anger turned into fury that crossed borders.  Fury was practiced by many politicians and activists. They wrote on their accounts, and published photos of the Kurdish victims in Kuya on their pages on social media. They attached those photos with writings that insulted the Iranian government and regarded its aggressive behavior a part of the malevolent Iranian mentality towards the Kurds, only because they are Kurds. Observers are concernd about Kurdish political affairs and the public has had visions of probable responses to the attack against Kuya. These responses can be summed up by dividing them into specific geographical areas:    

In Iran, public pressure on the Kurdish parties began to take shape in order to make these parties and forces cooperate and make a final merger among themselves. Because it is very difficult to integrate all the Kurdish parties into a single entity, and because the political divergence between a number of them, especially the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran and PKK is fundamental, it is possible to work on forming a public body for these parties and forces, and to define common points in order to achieve the Kurdish national goals. Working on the formation of this body, although it seems a long journey. Recent events and the feeling of many, who are concerned about the Iranian Kurdish issue, the extent of political risk on them, will push them, with the process of time, to search for ways to cast away internal divergences, and to concentrate on the solidification of the Internal Kurdish Front, and to enhance the politico–military action against the Iranian government.

The mobility of the Kurds intends to avoid turning their region into a holocaust for the settlement of international conflicts. They intend to strengthen their own power at the same time. The Kurdish parties and the Kurdish popular vision are currently focused on the consolidation of the canals of communication with the rest of the Iranian opposition although the Iranian opposition is scattered and weak. The Kurds also intend to identify focal figures for popular movements uprising in the Kurdish cities against the authorities of Tehran, where expansion of disturbances, strikes and demonstrations have been noticed in several Kurdish cities, which are a part of popular boiling of the Kurdish people in Iran.     

The Kurdish military body will try to solidify operations against the Iranian army in order to dismiss excuses for Iranian intervention in Kurdistan region. They will consolidate external political mobility in the Western countries to convey their messages to the entire world, and to obtain support and international coverage for their future operations.     

It seems important for the Kurds of Iran to benefit from their presence at the borders of Turkey and Iraq to strengthen political and social ties among themselves, which is normal for peoples who had been dismembered by borders. It also seems that the current developments have directed them to solidify their economic status by working on imports and exports of goods in an informal way after Iran began to turn their territories into a large jail after re-imposing US sanctions. 

In Iraq, the indirect Kurdish response in Iraq to Kuya attack will be decisive against the Iranian power in Iraq, as it uses Iraq, after the collapse of the dictator, Saddam Hussein by the Americans and British, as a corridor to interfere in Syria and Lebanon to solidify its regional presence, and to export its products there.   

The Kurdish responses will be divided into two divisions as follows:

The possible response made by the parties of Kurdistan in Iraq, and the Iranian Kurdish parties in Iraq and almost in Kurdistan Iraqi territories, as the Iranian threat to the region is expected to form an advantage for the Kurds to cooperate with the United States of America in Iraq, and to consolidate cooperation with the Iraqi political forces that are not affiliated with Tehran.   

Iraqi Kurdish parties will try to search for alliances with the Iraqi nationalist forces despite the introversion of these parties which are worried about the re- emerging of the politicians in the region. This was done instead of rapprochement with the Iraqi authorities that are close to Iran, especially the coalition of Mahdi Al-Amiri and Noury Al-Maliki which is affiliated with Tehran. They tend to avoid direct political and military clash with Tehran despite continuous Iranian violations at the borders of the region under various pretexts. The Kurdish parties will also practice diplomacy and self–restrain towards Iran’s aggressive acts. The parties will leave the arena for international bodies to practice more pressure, and to lift the embarrassment laid on these parties.

All parties of the territory will try to unofficially provide support to Iranian Kurdish bodies to prevent Iran from crushing them. These parties will also try curb the Iranian expansion in Syria by means of these parties. Instead, they will be an invincible obstacle in the north. They will benefit from the leakage of Iranian capitals, as the region has been the most secure territory neighboring Iran so far with the deterioration of politico-economical situations, and the emergence of politico-military contraction of its government that is close to Muslim Brothers Organization.      

As for the Iranian Kurdish parties in the region, they will try to cease their military operations that are launched from the Iraqi-Iranian borders. They will consolidate their presence within the Kurdish communities that have been displaced in the region for years. They will benefit from the presence of international bodies in Arbil and Sulaymaniyah to solidify their communication with the external world. The demand for unification will be their main goal. They will also be able to solidify their relations with Iraqi bodies that are rejecting the Iranian interference in Iraq as a whole. 

In Syria, rapprochement between the Americans and the Syrian Democratic Forces SDF will be the most important victory for the Kurds against the Iranian expansion in Syria. The United States of America will focus on deterring the Iranians from Syria which will be in favor of the Kurds there. The process of strengthening the Kurds and their Arab allies in Syria will free the Kurds in Syria and even in Iran from the threats of the Syrian regime and its allies that might help them regain control on their region which is rich in various natural resources. The Kurdish breakup in Syria from the Syrian power will be a breakup of the front of Kurdistan Freedom-Party that is affiliated with the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) which declared truce since the start of operations in Syria.     

Supporting the Kurds of Syria will strengthen the Kurds in Iran and vice versa. Many leaders of the Kurdish parties will obtain an additional access point to their autonomous areas in Syria, and they will also be able to communicate with the Americans there. It seems that the Kurd’s general aspiration in the area is to consolidate their alliance with the Western World, and not to be involved in sectarian conflicts prevailing in the Middle East at the expense of strengthening their national issues, provided that the Syrian Kurdish parties, with their various approaches, have announced their official condemnation of the Iranian military operation in Quesnjak.     

In Turkey, The Iranian Kurdish forces will benefit from the rigidity of the Turkish–Iranian borders in order to obtain support from their siblings on the other side of the borders, especially as Turkey has become far away from the Western support after it had been bragging for decades against the Kurdish aspirations in the region. The recent Turkish–Iranian rapprochement, which culminated under the siege on Kurdistan region in Iraq after the referendum of the region in September of the previous year that also culminated with the entry of Turkey in the North of Aleppo in exchange for the entry of Iran’s allies to Kirkuk. This will not go unnoticed for the current American Administration. The current American administration is suspiciously monitoring the acts of Turkey reproaching with Iran and Russia mainly in Syrian and generally on the international level.  

The dissatisfaction of European countries with Turkey’s support to political Islam, its constant blackmail of refugees’ issue and Turkey rapprochement with Russia will play an important role in strengthening the international front against Turkey. Fruits will be picked up by Kurds that have been opposing Turkey for decades. The Americans, who are constantly demanding Turkey to stop its economic deals with Iran, are aware of the Turkish rejection of the American demand, and they will allow The Kurdish forces to grow within Turkey that will, in turn, benefit Kurds in Iran, as strengthening and solidifying the presence the Kurds in Turkey will create a sustainable support to Kurds in Iran, and this will facilitate their movements and communication on the borders. Social, economic and military communication will strengthen the Kurdish forces on both sides of the border, and it will unify the Kurdish political agendas in Iran through enhancing negotiations between the Kurdistan Democratic Party and Kurdistan Freedom Party that is affiliated with Iranian Kurdistan Democratic Party. Communication will also help them coordinate their operations in Iran to be more effective, and to terminate widened rift there.      

On the international level, the Iranian Kurdish forces will work to consolidate their relations with Middle East countries in order to obtain support for their case, and to highlight Iran’s violations in the region which plays a key role in obtaining required support. The Kurdish bodies are expected to increase their monitoring of Iranian violations in Iran. These bodies will play a role in conveying Iran’s suspicious moves to the World, and they will be able to do that. Later, they will lead a number of demonstrations with other Iranian opposition against the Iranian regime abroad. They will try as much as they can to find a place amongst forces that will lead the assumed change process in Iran in the foreseeable days in order to secure their national rights, and to terminate the current tyranny burdening them.   

Conclusion:

As American sanctions on Iran have popped out on the scene again, with the increase of international suspicion over the Iranian acts in the Middle East and with the appearance of internal indignation over the Iranian Islamic rule, the issues of other nationalities in Iran will be constantly present in the international forums. As the Iranian sets of behavior are getting more and more aggressive and reckless as they were when they targeted Kuya in Kurdistan region with missiles, the Kurdish parties will urgently need to solidify their internal front to confront turbulent days in Iran. They will also need to solidify their relations with other opposing bodies in Iran, and to solidify their presence on both regional and international levels. They will need to strengthen their ties with influential powers like the United States and European countries to obtain required support as well. They should strive for their rights through concepts related to democracy, freedoms and political federal systems away from entering pitfalls of sectarian Sunni–Shiite conflict prevailing in the region.


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