For more than two decades, Germany has wrestled with the threat of Islamist terrorism. But how many attacks actually occurred, what answers did politics provide – and what price has society paid for the expansion of state security?
A newly released long-term study, titled “Configuration of Social and Political Practices in Dealing with Radical Islam,” attempts to shed light on these questions. Its findings are both sobering and revealing: much of what dominated public debate since 2001 appears less dramatic in hindsight, yet the political and security consequences are immense.
Between 2001 and 2023, Islamists carried out 15 attacks in Germany. Eighteen people were killed, at least 120 injured. Compared with France or Britain, this is a relatively small number – and yet it was enough to trigger a massive expansion of Germany’s security state.
Since 2015, almost all attacks or attempted attacks were linked to the so-called Islamic State. The perpetrators were highly motivated but often amateurish. Strikingly, in eleven of the fifteen cases, the attackers were already known to the authorities. The supposedly ever-present “invisible enemy” often turned out to be someone long on the radar – and still not stopped.
The study also illustrates how quickly political imagination spiraled into panic after 9/11. Suddenly, the talk was of sleeper cells, global networks, and existential threats to democracy itself. Only years later did it become clear that the main danger came from lone actors and small salafi jihadist groups.
Nevertheless, the Bundestag (German federal parliament) drew sweeping conclusions: 80 terrorism-related laws were passed between 2001 and 2023 – ranging from expanded powers for police and intelligence services, to criminal law reforms, to data retention schemes whose legality and utility remain fiercely contested. Civil liberties became a bargaining chip, balanced between alarmism and reassurance.
The strength of the study is not in groundbreaking revelations, but in connecting well-known facts. And the lesson is uncomfortable: Germany invested heavily in its security apparatus, but far less in social resilience and prevention. Only in the 2010s did policymakers begin to recognize that Islamist extremism cannot be countered by police powers and surveillance alone, but also requires social strategies – too late, and too cautiously.
The result is a security state that now extends far beyond the concrete threat. New databases, the Joint Counter-Terrorism Center, and ever more sophisticated surveillance technologies have become permanent fixtures. Even if the Islamist threat subsides, these instruments will remain – with all the risks they pose to freedom and openness.
The real question, then, is no longer how serious the threat of Islamist terrorism in Germany actually is. It is this: How long do we want to live in a state of emergency – and how much freedom are we prepared to sacrifice in the name of security, permanently?
