Russia Seeks Victory in Afghanistan

Russia has become the first country in the world to officially recognize the Taliban government in Afghanistan — a move that constitutes strong support for the movement, which has failed to honor its commitments to the international community, especially regarding women’s rights and the freedom of religious minorities. Russian support is considered significant due to Moscow’s status as a global power and a permanent member of the UN Security Council, among other factors that benefit the Taliban — without requiring major ideological or political concessions from them.

Although Russia’s economic and trade interests are part of the motivation behind the resumption of relations between Moscow and Kabul, the Russian objective appears to go further. It is tied to Moscow’s broader ambition to challenge U.S. influence worldwide, as well as to historical considerations linked to Russia’s defeat at the hands of the mujahideen. The Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989 after suffering a military defeat and soon afterward collapsed, losing the Cold War. Observers believe that Russian President Vladimir Putin has long desired to avenge that loss by returning to Afghanistan.

On July 4, 2025, the Taliban’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced Russia’s official recognition of its government, the raising of the Taliban flag over the Afghan embassy building in Moscow, and the accreditation of Joul Hassan as the movement’s first ambassador to Russia.

Taming the Taliban Through Diplomacy

Russia’s recognition of the Taliban government was not a surprise. Contacts between the movement and Moscow have continued since the U.S. withdrawal and the Taliban’s takeover of the country. Western reports have even indicated that Russia previously provided significant financial support to the Taliban in exchange for carrying out military operations against NATO soldiers in Afghanistan — despite Moscow’s formal designation of the Taliban as a terrorist organization following the September 11, 2001 attacks, and its subsequent ban on the group in February 2003.

Unlike many other countries, Russia did not abandon its embassy in Kabul after the Taliban seized power in August 2021. Communication between Moscow and Kabul has intensified in recent years. Russian Ambassador Dmitry Zhirnov told the state-run RIA Novosti news agency: “Afghanistan is an important destination for us. Relations are developing well, and contacts are increasing significantly.”

Before Russia’s formal recognition, representatives of the Taliban authorities had visited Russia and attended Russian economic forums. Conversely, Russian ministers of foreign affairs, industry and trade, higher education, and education visited Kabul. Meanwhile, Afghanistan continued drifting away from the West. Recently, U.S. President Donald Trump imposed a “travel ban” on Afghan citizens, barring them from entering the United States — deepening the rift between the two countries.

Russia, in turn, accelerated its diplomatic steps toward the Taliban. Nearly 40 years after the Soviet Union failed to subdue Afghanistan by force, Moscow now seems determined to tame the Taliban through diplomacy. While the Soviets were once seen as occupiers and enemies, the image of the “foreign invader” is now associated — especially among younger generations — with the U.S.-led coalition forces. The painful memories of the Soviet military presence still linger among older generations and in some regions, but they no longer carry the same weight. Russia’s image in Afghanistan has improved considerably.

What also paves the way for Moscow’s growing role is the dire economic and humanitarian situation in Afghanistan. The government of Hibatullah Akhundzada cannot afford to be selective in its diplomatic dealings with potential international partners — especially not with a global actor of Russia’s stature.

Counterterrorism

Afghanistan’s geography — both its location and terrain — has long made it attractive to terrorist organizations, most notably al-Qaeda, once led by Osama bin Laden. Today, a similar dynamic applies to the Islamic State–Khorasan Province (IS-K), the Taliban’s declared enemy. This group was responsible for the March 22, 2024 attack on the Crocus City Hall near Moscow, which killed 145 people. IS-K is thus a common enemy of both Russia and the Taliban government.

The organization was formally established on January 26, 2015, when ISIS spokesperson Abu Muhammad al-Adnani announced the creation of the “Khorasan Province.” Its stronghold lies along the Afghan-Pakistani border — between Afghanistan’s Nangarhar province and Pakistan’s former tribal areas of Kurram and Orakzai. Centered along the Jalalabad–Peshawar axis and the historic Khyber Pass, the group initially consisted of tribal leaders who had defected from the Pakistani Taliban.

IS-K activities have mainly focused on Kabul and Peshawar, targeting Shiite Hazaras and Pakistani communities. But in 2020, under a new leader, Sanaullah Ghafari, an urban warfare specialist believed to be behind the August 26, 2021 Kabul airport attack that killed around 190 people, IS-K changed its strategy.

Under Ghafari’s leadership, IS-K — while facing brutal repression from the Taliban — has sought to undermine Taliban authority by developing guerrilla tactics, sabotaging infrastructure, and carrying out high-profile international attacks. Deadly operations in Moscow, Kerman (Iran), and New Orleans, as well as failed attacks in Europe, are part of this strategy. These operations have elevated IS-K’s status among jihadist actors in Central Asia, particularly among Tajik and Uzbek populations targeted by the group’s propaganda.

UN Security Council experts now consider IS-K the greatest current threat to regional stability. The group recently demonstrated its reach by assassinating Afghanistan’s Minister of Refugees and Repatriation, Khalil-ur-Rahman Haqqani, on December 11, 2024. IS-K also publicly criticized Russia’s recognition of the Taliban. For its part, Moscow views cooperation with the Taliban as essential to combating IS-K, based in the Afghan-Pakistani borderlands.

Promising Projects

Due to the economic fallout from sanctions imposed on Moscow since the start of the Russia-Ukraine war, supporting the Taliban could bring Russia considerable benefits — giving it an advantage over other geopolitical players competing for influence in Central Asia.

Senior Taliban officials were already invited to the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum in June 2024, alongside discussions of potential Russian projects to extract raw materials from Afghan territory.

Infrastructure projects designed to access Indian and Pakistani markets also require safe transit routes through Afghanistan and government cooperation. Russia plans to build a gas pipeline across Afghanistan to supply these growing markets — providing Moscow with an alternative to the European Union for its gas exports. Russia also wants to participate in a trans-Afghan railway project, which Uzbekistan and Pakistan are also interested in. However, the plan could face security risks, since parts of the proposed route would connect Kabul and Peshawar, an area where IS-K is active.

Experts note that the Russian economy remains cautious about major involvement in Afghanistan, given its instability and danger. Even the 2022 fuel and wheat supply agreement between Moscow and Kabul remains incomplete. Meanwhile, Iran, China, and Pakistan continue to be Afghanistan’s main trading partners.

Russia faces funding challenges in all its planned projects. Afghanistan would gladly accept any Russian investment but lacks the means to pay for it. In other words, Russia can build there — but only at its own expense. At best, some ventures may prove profitable but high-risk; at worst, Russian money will be wasted, as happened with Moscow’s investments in Syria.

An Old Russian Ambition

For Putin, the collapse of the Soviet Union was a catastrophic event — symbolizing the loss of prestige and influence. Yet he appears to have drawn different conclusions than his Soviet predecessors: he prioritizes realism over ideology in achieving his goals. Putin has consistently maintained ties with all actors in the Middle East — governments and major opposition movements alike. He has applied a similar dual-track approach in Afghanistan.

Putin initially supported the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan, but that support was conditional. By 2009, Moscow pressured Kyrgyzstan to close the U.S. Manas Air Base. The American military presence in Central Asia worried Moscow at least as much as the Taliban threat. Putin never wanted U.S. bases in a region historically viewed as Russia’s “soft underbelly.” Over the years, Moscow has sought influence in Afghanistan not only for security reasons but also to weaken the West and NATO.

Putin’s long-term goal is to undermine the U.S.-led liberal security order established after World War II and replace it with his vision of a multipolar world. For Putin, America’s withdrawal from Afghanistan weakened that order and created a vacuum that Russia feels compelled to fill.

Although many analysts predicted that Russia would become bogged down in Syria after Putin’s September 2015 military intervention, he sought to keep involvement limited to avoid repeating the Soviet Afghan experience. Still, Russian losses in Syria were significant.

Moscow now hopes Afghanistan might offer an opportunity to compensate — at least symbolically — for those losses. As desperate Afghans clung to departing U.S. aircraft in Kabul, Russia’s (and China’s) influence seemed poised to expand almost by default.

Another motivation behind Moscow’s move is its response to the West’s rapid legitimization of Islamic authorities in Syria that overthrew former President Bashar al-Assad. The Kremlin concluded that international relations have descended into a form of extreme realism where moral concerns can be ignored.

Recognizing the Taliban is thus primarily a symbolic step — taken at a time when Russia’s main Middle Eastern partners are suffering defeats or setbacks. Among these were Israeli airstrikes on Iran, which revealed Moscow’s unwillingness to defend or arm its Iranian ally. Russia’s problems in the Middle East now extend well beyond troop reductions in Syria or faltering investments in Iran.

Russia’s status as an indispensable great power has gradually eroded. Consequently, Moscow feels compelled to take actions that restore its image as an influential actor capable of setting the agenda — and recognizing the Taliban serves precisely that purpose. Being the first country to establish formal diplomatic relations with the Taliban government ensures Russia a leading role in regional security discussions.

Furthermore, defining the “rules of the game” is a hallmark of global power. By recognizing the Taliban, Russia seeks to demonstrate itself as a bold, norm-breaking power willing to set precedents for others.

Will Russia’s Move Open the Door for Others?

Several countries already deal with the Taliban government in ways approaching full recognition — notably China and Afghanistan’s neighbors, who must engage with the Taliban for strategic and security reasons. It is likely that Russia’s allies in Central Asia will follow Moscow’s lead.

If Afghan-Russian relations deepen, China may feel compelled to recognize the Taliban under competitive pressure. Beijing had already engaged the Taliban before the U.S. withdrawal, hosting its leaders in 2019, and in 2023, a Chinese state oil company signed a 25-year contract to extract oil from the Amu Darya River. In 2024, China accredited an official Taliban envoy — though it clarified that it did not recognize the government itself.

Since taking power, the Taliban have imposed severely repressive laws against women and girls, restricting access to education, employment, and public spaces. The Taliban regime, dominated by Pashtuns, continues to encourage the confiscation of property belonging to ethnic minorities — Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazaras — in favor of Pashtuns and government supporters.

The Taliban have shown little interest in appeasing the international community or making their government more inclusive, ignoring even requests from China and Russia. It appears that realpolitik has prevailed in Moscow: the Taliban are in power — and are likely to remain so for the foreseeable future — therefore, they must be dealt with.

However, Russia’s recognition of such a violent movement sends a powerful signal to militant Islamist groups worldwide: if they seize power, they may gain recognition from major powers. This carries serious risks for many countries already struggling with terrorism.

Moscow’s rapprochement with the Taliban has also raised concerns that extremists might gain greater acceptance within Muslim communities in Asia and even within Russia itself. The Mufti of the Spiritual Assembly of Muslims of Russia, Albir Krganov, expressed his “concern” about closer ties with the Taliban, warning that Taliban-linked groups among Central Asian populations could “destabilize” Russia’s Muslim-majority regions.

Conclusions

• Russia’s formal recognition of the Taliban government is a symbolic move aimed at reasserting its global influence and challenging the United States — reflecting the Kremlin’s desire for historical revenge after the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan.
• Moscow seeks to exploit Afghanistan’s economic and humanitarian collapse to expand its presence through infrastructure and energy projects, despite the high financial and security risks.
• Russian–Taliban cooperation is rooted in shared security concerns, especially combating ISIS–Khorasan, now the greatest regional threat.
• Russia’s step may encourage China and Central Asian states to follow suit, reshaping regional alliances at the West’s expense — though the Taliban remain internally oppressive toward women and minorities.
• This move carries serious political and security risks, signaling to extremist groups that seizing power by force may eventually lead to international recognition, thereby fueling extremism in Central Asia and even within Russia.

Sources:

• Novastan – July 3, 2025
• Tagesschau – April 17, 2025
• Washington Institute – August 18, 2021
• Deutsche Welle – April 18, 2025
• Al Jazeera – July 5, 2025
• Carnegie Endowment – July 10, 2025