The Dilemma of Disarming Hezbollah in Lebanon

The debate in Lebanon over disarming Iran-backed Hezbollah is intensifying. The Lebanese government has approved a U.S. plan, through a cabinet decision, stipulating that all weapons in the country must be placed under state control by the end of 2025. This effectively aims at disarming Hezbollah, the most powerful non-state actor in Lebanon for decades.

U.S. envoy Tom Barrack congratulated Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, President Joseph Aoun, and the cabinet on what he described as their “historic, courageous, and correct” decision. He said that the government’s resolutions represented a tangible first step toward applying the principle of “one country, one army.”

Yet the demand to disarm Hezbollah constitutes a major political gamble for the Lebanese government. Concerns loom that the country could slide into another political crisis if Hezbollah’s ministers resign in protest, while others fear such a move could plunge Lebanon into civil war amid the broader instability gripping the region.

Difficulty of Implementation

Analysts say fully disarming Hezbollah will be extremely difficult. The group possesses a vast arsenal and is deeply embedded in segments of Lebanese society. Its weaponry, modernized through decades of uninterrupted Iranian support, has in many respects surpassed that of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), making Hezbollah militarily dominant, especially in the south. Experts predict that in the event of a confrontation with the army, Hezbollah would be capable of defending itself and forcing a stalemate.

Hezbollah could also obstruct government decisions through its allies. Its alliance with the Amal Movement, known as the “Shiite duo,” has already declared its opposition to any disarmament. Hezbollah could mobilize hundreds of thousands of supporters and withdraw from the government, threatening Lebanon’s fragile political balance.

Ordering the Lebanese army to confront Hezbollah risks igniting civil war. The army itself could fracture along sectarian lines—about 60 percent of its rank-and-file are Shiites, many of them tied to southern Lebanon and the Bekaa Valley. It is unrealistic to expect Shiite soldiers to turn their weapons against their own communities. The precedent of the second Lebanese civil war is clear: the army disintegrated along sectarian lines. That danger remains today.

A Symbolic Step in Palestinian Camps

The Lebanese army has begun collecting weapons from a Palestinian refugee camp for the first time. The state news agency reported that a truck loaded with covered arms left the Burj al-Barajneh camp near Beirut without incident. Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas’s office confirmed an agreement with Lebanon to begin transferring weapons. His spokesman, Nabil Abu Rudeineh, announced that additional transfers from other camps would follow.

Palestinian refugee camps across Lebanon remain under the control of various factions, and past attacks have been planned from these areas. During a visit to Beirut last May, Abbas had already called for ending all armed activity outside state control in Lebanon. Yet he does not represent all Palestinian groups; movements such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad often diverge sharply from the Palestinian Authority’s positions.

From Israel’s perspective, however, the recent moves were more symbolic than substantive. Retired Colonel Jacques Neriah of the Jerusalem Institute for Security and Strategy dismissed the Burj al-Barajneh operation as “theater.” Journalists and photographers were notified, soldiers stood waiting, and a truck drove out with a few bags presented as weapons. “For anyone who knows Lebanon, this was a staged scenario. If applied to all camps, it would mean the government has no intention of actually enforcing disarmament,” he said.

While Lebanon has a strong legal basis for disarming the camps, such arrangements are futile if the strongest factions remain armed. With Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya rejecting disarmament deals, the state’s authority inside the camps remains weak at best. Still, proponents argue that this move could lay the groundwork for eventually disarming Hezbollah: if the army can successfully manage the Palestinian file, it may prove that disarmament is possible gradually, under Lebanese leadership with international backing. But Israel is closely monitoring Lebanon’s implementation, leaving little room for maneuver.

The U.S. Plan

This time, Washington appears more resolute. The decision, seemingly taken at the highest levels, comes down to disarmament—or Lebanon will be left to fend for itself. The United States has presented what appears to be a multi-faceted incentive plan centered on economic support. Envoy Tom Barrack said Saudi Arabia and Qatar were prepared to invest in a special economic zone in southern Lebanon, near the Israeli border, to provide jobs for Hezbollah members and supporters after they lay down arms. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said Israel might begin withdrawing forces from southern Lebanon following “the Lebanese government’s historic decision” to disarm Hezbollah.

A key challenge is reintegrating Hezbollah’s fighters, long funded by Iran. Barrack explained: “We have 40,000 people paid by Iran to fight. What will you do with them? Take their weapons and tell them, ‘Good luck planting olive trees’? That’s not realistic. We need to help them.”

He said the U.S., Gulf states, and Lebanon would work together to create an economic forum ensuring sustainable livelihoods for former fighters. The U.S.-backed LAF is preparing a disarmament plan, but Barrack stressed that economic measures must accompany it.

Regarding the UN peacekeeping force (UNIFIL) deployed in southern Lebanon since 1978, Barrack said Washington preferred to fund the LAF rather than UNIFIL, supporting only a one-year extension of its mandate.

To encourage Hezbollah to hand over its weapons, Netanyahu reiterated that Israel could start pulling back troops from the south. But such statements risk backfiring: Hezbollah supporters see them as proof the government has become Israel’s partner, bolstering the group’s narrative of “resistance” and alienating moderates who reject the notion of Israel “helping” Lebanon disarm one-third of its population.

The Risk of Civil War

The Lebanese government has now embarked on a path no previous administration has taken since the end of the civil war in 1990. The U.S. is placing the burden of disarming Hezbollah squarely on the government and army, effectively pitting them against the group. Experts warn that pressing for rapid disarmament could destabilize Lebanon, spark internal conflict, or even another civil war. They argue for a gradual, slow process that strengthens state institutions first and integrates Hezbollah members into nation-building to avoid alienating them.

But the problem with a slow-moving strategy is that time favors Hezbollah. The group counts on Israel, the U.S., and the Lebanese government losing momentum. Its strategy is always to prolong the process, buying time to rebuild its military capabilities.

The government’s U.S.-backed decision has already prompted Hezbollah to vow it will not give up its weapons—even if that means civil war. The group insists Israel must first withdraw and halt its attacks, and even then it would only agree to discuss—not commit to—disarmament. Hezbollah maintains that its weapons are its identity and honor, that “death is preferable to surrender,” and that it remains Lebanon’s shield against Israel.

In recent years, Hezbollah has also expanded its narrative: since the fall of the Assad regime, it claims to defend Lebanon against Sunni jihadists from Syria, citing its 2017 joint campaign with the Lebanese army against ISIS in Arsal. Alongside rebuilding its infrastructure and arsenal, Hezbollah is reinforcing these justifications for keeping its weapons.

Critics warn that Hezbollah has no stake in state-building. Its strength lies in Lebanon’s divisions and weakness, enabling it to operate as a “state within a state,” maintain its Shiite base’s loyalty, and keep that community isolated from national institutions.

Still, Hezbollah’s position has weakened: Iran and the broader Shiite axis have lost ground, Assad’s fall cut off supply lines, and U.S. and international backing for the Lebanese government has grown. Some of Hezbollah’s allies have even shifted. While Amal has not formally endorsed disarmament, Finance Minister Yassin Jaber of Amal stressed that state-building must take priority. Hezbollah’s Christian ally, the Free Patriotic Movement, also reiterated its long-standing call to confine all arms to the state and implement international resolutions.

It remains clear, however, that Hezbollah will not disarm voluntarily. The likelihood is that the LAF would eventually have to confront it if disarmament were seriously pursued. Delaying the move will only give Hezbollah time to regroup and strengthen, making any future clash more dangerous.

Thus far, the army’s role has been extremely limited. According to The Guardian, the lack of public evidence of weapons seizures reflects the government’s desire not to provoke Hezbollah by publicizing such operations. The chance of the army independently dismantling Hezbollah’s arsenal is slim.

A deeper concern for many Lebanese is that the LAF cannot currently defend the country against an Israeli attack. Without Hezbollah’s arsenal, Lebanon would be exposed, and the army is unlikely to retaliate against Israel. This reality fuels demands for U.S. and French guarantees, as well as clear Israeli commitments to avoid future aggression. To date, no state has offered such assurances.

Hezbollah’s Options

In rejecting the decision, Hezbollah could escalate by having its four ministers (with Amal) resign, paralyzing parliament through its sizeable bloc, or mobilizing its street base with shows of force. Confrontation with the army is also possible, though such a clash would dramatically shift public opinion against Hezbollah, particularly if it turned its guns on the LAF.

With such starkly divergent positions, the risk of escalation is high. Washington is pressing Lebanon into a corner: either submit to U.S.-Israeli conditions, or face isolation and the suspension of critical aid for reconstruction and economic recovery.

Even if the U.S. offered guarantees, Hezbollah and Amal cannot accept disarmament under U.S.-Israeli terms. Escalation, possibly up to full confrontation, remains on the table.

According to Kenneth Katzman, a scholar of strategic and international security studies, neither Washington nor Tel Aviv seeks to “eliminate” Hezbollah—as with Hamas—but rather to strip it of weapons while allowing political engagement. From the U.S. perspective, disarmament could pave the way for border demarcation and even eventual normalization of ties between Lebanon and Israel. The Trump administration, he said, is not demanding immediate disarmament but views it as a necessary eventual step, given Hezbollah’s role as an Iranian proxy.

Yet normalization with Israel is broadly rejected by most Lebanese, analysts note. At best, Lebanon could return to the 1949 armistice framework. Lebanese factions remain split into three camps: one that demands unconditional disarmament of Hezbollah, another that categorically rejects it, and a third that supports disarmament but acknowledges Hezbollah’s concerns.

Hezbollah could again escalate against Israel, but any new war would be devastating: it has lost its supply lines after Assad’s fall and seen its intelligence and logistical capabilities eroded. The most optimistic scenario would be Hezbollah ultimately laying down its weapons and turning to politics, as other militias did after the civil war. But sources say this would never happen without a quid pro quo—and Iran ultimately holds the final say. More likely, Hezbollah will simply seek to buy time.

Israel, meanwhile, sees this as a rare opportunity to end Hezbollah’s military power and may act militarily if the disarmament plan stalls. It has already sent clear warnings through media and diplomatic channels that it would not hesitate to launch destructive operations if Lebanon fails to implement the disarmament clause in the ceasefire agreement.

Cornered, Hezbollah is ramping up counter-pressure on Lebanese leaders through shows of force, including protests, demonstrations, and occasional unrest. Its enduring popularity within Lebanon’s Shiite community allows it to firmly oppose the government’s “historic decision.”

Iran’s stance remains the most crucial factor. But even in Tehran, views are shifting: while conservatives continue to back Hezbollah, reformist voices have recently urged non-interference in Lebanese internal affairs. They warn that intervention could damage Iran’s standing and hand Washington and Tel Aviv a new pretext for action.

Conclusions

• Disarming Hezbollah is extremely difficult given its modern arsenal, Iranian backing, and deep roots in Lebanese society, particularly in the south and Bekaa. Any army confrontation risks sectarian fracture.
• The government has begun removing some weapons from Palestinian refugee camps, but the move has been widely dismissed as symbolic, with major factions like Hamas and Islamic Jihad rejecting disarmament—highlighting the state’s weakness.
• Washington has advanced a comprehensive plan linking disarmament to Gulf investments in southern Lebanon and partial Israeli withdrawal. Yet this could be perceived as a Lebanese-Israeli alignment against Hezbollah.
• Rapid pressure for disarmament could push Lebanon into internal conflict or civil war. Hezbollah is likely to stall for time, relying on state weakness. Its options include government withdrawal, street mobilization, or escalation with Israel. Ultimately, Iran will decide Hezbollah’s course.