The Gaza Strip war reshaped the region, upending the balance of power and opening the door to scenarios that were previously unlikely in the Middle East. The period between Hamas’s attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, and the twelve-day war between Israel and Iran in June 2025 represented a transitional phase in which a new Middle Eastern order gradually emerged. The most significant developments of these two years were Iran’s defeat in a direct conflict with Israel and the temporary halt of the Islamic Republic’s regional expansion. Added to this was the fall of the Assad regime in Syria, which not only weakened Iran but also constituted a major strategic victory for Türkiye.
However, the consequences of these tumultuous events also affected relations between Türkiye and Israel, and they may pave the way for a decline in the traditional Gulf-U.S. alliance while opening the door to new regional and international alignments that reduce reliance on Washington—especially on security matters. Meanwhile, Türkiye has emerged with new roles in regional conflicts.
Türkiye remained out of the spotlight during the Israel–Iran confrontation, yet it benefited significantly from the weakening of the Islamic Republic. This was most evident in Syria, where Iran lost its sole ally in December 2024 with the fall of the Assad regime, while Türkiye gained a new ally in “New Syria,” led by President Ahmad al-Shar’a.
Major Consequences of the Al-Aqsa Flood Operation
Although the war began on October 7, 2023, in the Gaza Strip, the major political repercussions occurred outside Gaza and became a launch point for reshaping the region. Opinions differed: some argued that Hamas’s attack gave Israel a pretext for excessive violence, as Israeli sources claim, while others believed that Netanyahu’s government had been planning its project regardless of whether Hamas launched its operation or not.
The war expanded and reached Lebanon, following Hezbollah’s so-called “support war” for Hamas. Israel launched an intense campaign against Hezbollah, employing unprecedented advanced intelligence operations such as detonating wireless pager devices, which killed dozens of party leaders. Israel also succeeded in a series of targeted assassinations that eliminated Hezbollah’s top leaders, including Hassan Nasrallah, exposing major infiltration within the party. Ultimately, Hezbollah was forced to accept a ceasefire with Israel, making significant concessions. As a result, Hezbollah’s influence and standing in Lebanon declined sharply, and the Lebanese government recently decided—under American and Arab support—to restrict weapons exclusively to the state, placing Hezbollah in a severe predicament.
In Syria, the fall of President Bashar al-Assad occurred ten days after the Lebanon ceasefire. Although Israel did not claim responsibility for the regime’s downfall, it argued that it was an indirect outcome of Hezbollah’s defeat and the weakening of the Iranian axis, which became unable to support the Syrian president. Added to that, Russia’s preoccupation with the war in Ukraine reduced its regional role and prevented it from providing essential support to Assad.
The Israeli military moved quickly on the night of Assad’s escape, occupying the buffer zone on the already-occupied Golan border. It advanced deeper into Syrian territory toward Mount Hermon and the surrounding towns, positioning itself near the outskirts of Damascus.
Israeli strikes extended to the Houthis in Yemen. It became clear that this war was a confrontation between Israel and Iran’s regional “proxy strategy” surrounding Israel. Thus, the conflict was not with Hamas, Iran, or Hezbollah individually, but with the entire regional structure Iran had built over the past 40 years.
The climax occurred when Israel, supported by the United States, attacked Iran. The Israeli Air Force carried out widespread assassinations of Iranian officials and scientists, while U.S. and Israeli airstrikes targeted Iran’s nuclear reactors in unprecedented fashion in June 2025. The attacks culminated with a devastating American strike on the highly fortified Fordow uranium enrichment site. Washington declared that it had eliminated Iran’s nuclear program, while Tehran insisted the strikes did not affect its nuclear capability and that its enriched uranium stockpile remained safe.
Later, in September, an Israeli strike in Doha targeted the Hamas delegation attending negotiations over President Trump’s ceasefire proposal for Gaza and the release of hostages. This marked a pivotal turning point in the relationship between the Arab “moderate states” and both Israel and the United States, which had prior knowledge of the strike.
In sum, the region witnessed not only a decline in Iranian influence but also a pattern of extreme force by Israel. At the same time, Türkiye—now the main supporter of Syria’s new rulers—worked diligently to fill the vacuum left by Iran, whether through its presence in Syria, growing influence in Lebanon (especially Tripoli), or its loud opposition to Israeli military operations in Gaza.
How the Gaza War Boosted Türkiye’s Rise
Turkish-Israeli relations were enjoying significant diplomatic improvement before the war, marked by steps toward normalization, restoring ambassadors, and rebuilding ties that had deteriorated in previous years. Full diplomatic relations were reinstated during the Bennett-Lapid government, and Türkiye maintained ties during Netanyahu’s tenure.
Relations deteriorated after the Gaza war. Erdoğan reiterated that Hamas is not a terrorist organization and accused Israel of committing war crimes, while senior Hamas figures continued to reside in Türkiye. He also attacked Western support for Israel, arguing that unconditional Western backing was transforming the conflict into a clash between East and West.
Türkiye emerged as a leading voice in global anti-Israel mobilization. Ankara supported a lawsuit against Israel at the International Court of Justice in August 2024 accusing it of genocide. Turkish leadership also made repeated provocative statements—such as comparing Netanyahu to Adolf Hitler—leading both countries to recall their ambassadors once again.
Beyond political support, Türkiye plays a key role in funding Hamas. According to a September 2023 report in Kuwait’s Al-Siyassah, senior official Bakri Hanifa transferred funds from Qatar through Istanbul, reportedly amounting to tens of millions of dollars distributed to Hamas in Gaza. Hamas figure Maher Ubeid was also said to have conducted transactions through Turkish money exchangers.
Circumstances further favored Türkiye. Turkish-Egyptian relations, previously strained, improved rapidly due to the Egyptian military’s need to diversify its arms suppliers and benefit from Turkish military technology—especially after the Israeli strike in Doha and Israeli media attacks on Cairo’s refusal to accept the displacement of Gazans into Sinai. Jordan also improved ties with Türkiye to help maintain stability in Syria. Political analyst and AKP member Yusuf Katipoğlu confirmed that Jordan and Türkiye agreed to strengthen joint defense cooperation in response to new Israeli threats in Syria and what he called Israeli territorial ambitions “reaching Anatolia.”
Turkish analysts argue that the region is undergoing a long-term strategic shift. New blocs are forming: Türkiye and several Arab states on one side; Israel and other regional powers on another; and Iran with its remaining allies on a third. Others believe these alignments are pragmatic and temporary responses to emerging threats rather than deep strategic alliances.
Sources say Erdoğan views the Gaza ceasefire as an opportunity to play a larger regional role, possibly through contributing to monitoring the ceasefire. Alongside the U.S., Egypt, the UAE, and Qatar, Türkiye intends to send forces—a symbolic but important gesture underscoring Ankara’s leadership ambitions.
For Erdoğan, a military presence in Gaza evokes memories of Ottoman influence. Yet such deployment increases the chances of direct friction between Israeli and Turkish forces. This is highly sensitive for Israel, which strongly opposes Turkish forces in neighboring Syria. Israel escalated airstrikes on Syrian airbases in early April 2025 in a pre-emptive move against Türkiye’s reported plans to deploy troops there.
No Stability in Syria
Syria is the most ambiguous file in Turkish-Israeli relations. Many indicators suggest the country is heading toward de facto partition into spheres of influence. Southern Syria, under both declared and undeclared arrangements, is now effectively under Israeli security guarantees. Israel also sees the Kurds of northeast Syria as potential allies, while Türkiye seeks to consolidate the rule of Damascus’s new leadership, having significantly strengthened its position and ousted Iranian influence.
With Türkiye’s substantial support, New Syria is expected to align closely with Ankara. However, Israel views the Turkey-backed Islamic government in Damascus as a long-term threat due to its jihadist background and is already attempting to push these forces away from its borders.
According to Syrian and regional reports, Israeli forces dismantled Turkish monitoring equipment near Damascus and seized “secret and sensitive” systems—an act seen as a direct challenge to Ankara. Syrian and Saudi sources said warnings were issued to Damascus “not to play with fire and blindly follow Turkish orders,” arguing that Türkiye was trying to get dangerously close to Israel.
Israel remains committed to containing Iranian influence and maintaining operational freedom against Hezbollah in Syria. Türkiye, meanwhile, has heavily invested in weakening Kurdish interests and supporting the government of Ahmad al-Shar’a. Ultimately, Gaza was the pretext for most of today’s confrontation, but the deeper strategic dispute is over Syria’s future—even if this discussion remains less explicit.
Earlier this year, reports indicated that both countries discussed establishing a “de-confliction mechanism” to avoid direct clashes in Syria’s airspace. The agreement failed, leaving Syria a permanent fault line in their relations.
Is a Future Confrontation Likely?
Türkiye today possesses a powerful combination of military, economic, and diplomatic strength that makes it one of the most influential regional players. It is a G20 economy deeply integrated into global markets, with a defense industry exporting drones and naval systems, and a NATO army supported by extensive domestic production. Its geography amplifies its leverage: it controls the Dardanelles and deploys forces in northern Cyprus.
Ankara is also expanding its role in multilateral forums, most recently through participation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit alongside Russia and China. The development of advanced Turkish air-defense systems—such as the newly unveiled “Steel Dome”—signals Ankara’s ambition for greater self-reliance and regional influence.
However, according to Hay Eytan Cohen Yanarocak, “Türkiye does not pose an existential threat to Israel,” noting: “Despite differences, it is still theoretically considered a friendly state. In fact, bilateral relations have never witnessed a declaration of war.”
Strong diplomatic ties among Türkiye, Israel, and their respective partners act as an incentive against conflict. With backing from reliable allies such as the U.S. and Azerbaijan, agreements to ease tensions could be achieved. Although Ankara denies it, de-escalation benefits Türkiye as much as Israel. Despite Türkiye’s strong military, its alliances—especially NATO membership—push it toward resolving disputes peacefully.
Türkiye avoids direct war with Israel because such a conflict would harm its relations with Western states. Ankara relies on its strategic indispensability: as a NATO member with strong security ties to the U.S., Erdoğan positions Türkiye as an essential partner. His approach appears successful: Germany recently approved exports of Eurofighter jets to Türkiye, and criticism from Berlin regarding human rights and political repression in Türkiye has significantly softened.
Thus Erdoğan acts confidently toward the EU. Amid the war with Russia, some in Brussels view Türkiye—NATO’s largest land force—as a crucial partner on the Middle East’s doorstep, despite ongoing tensions with Greece.
Many analysts believe the Gaza war provided Erdoğan with domestic and regional incentives to escalate tensions with Israel. “Türkiye has an interest in reinforcing anti-Israel policies,” said Gallia Lindenstrauss of the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS). “This helps the government build domestic support, as the Palestinian cause is highly popular in Türkiye.”
Erdoğan also used the crisis to enhance his standing in the Muslim world. Lindenstrauss noted: “Support for Gaza significantly boosts Erdoğan’s popularity among Muslims. Polls show his standing rising across the Arab world.”
Yet in reality, Türkiye has no intention of provoking an actual conflict with Israel. Ankara itself initiated the restoration of full diplomatic relations two years ago as part of a “zero-problems” strategy to escape regional isolation in the Middle East.
At the same time, Türkiye has not severed ties with Israel. Its criticism has focused mainly on Netanyahu for waging a destructive war in Gaza. Ankara now seeks to preserve minimal ties in order to play a regional role after the war, knowing that Israeli opposition to Turkish involvement could ultimately lead to undesirable outcomes, including a shift in Washington’s stance toward Türkiye—potentially resulting in sanctions, as happened after the S-400 missile purchase.
A Multi-Polar Middle East
The conflicts from 2023 to 2025 were primarily between regional powers—Israel and Iran (and Iran’s allies: Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis). The U.S. intervened decisively only when Israeli firepower failed to destroy Iran’s nuclear facilities. Yet this should not obscure the fact that the era of uncontested American dominance in the Middle East is ending, replaced by a multi-polar order. The U.S. still exerts major influence but increasingly seeks distance, allowing regional powers to step in and shape the next phase of the Middle East. No single state can impose its vision on the others. This lies at the heart of the current competition among Türkiye, Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and other influential states.
At the same time, Israel’s standing suffered over the past two years because of the Gaza war, despite its military superiority. Before the war, it had made significant progress in breaking regional isolation, signing the Abraham Accords with the UAE, Bahrain, and Morocco, and beginning talks with Saudi Arabia. But this momentum reversed due to excessive use of force, pushing regional states closer to each other as they sought collective deterrence against Israel.
Türkiye’s growing influence in Syria also concerns Saudi Arabia. For Riyadh, replacing Iranian-backed Shiite extremism with Turkish-backed Sunni extremism is hardly an improvement. Although Saudi Arabia lacks Israel’s military leverage, it has massive financial influence—particularly at a time when Türkiye faces economic difficulties. Ankara also noted how Washington boosted Riyadh’s diplomatic standing through U.S.-Russian talks hosted in Saudi Arabia.
Analysts argue that if Washington wants to reduce its direct involvement in regional security, it must also balance Saudi Arabia against Türkiye—and Saudi Arabia against Israel.
Conclusions
— The fall of Assad gave Türkiye direct influence in “New Syria,” while Israel sees this as a long-term threat and seeks security arrangements to keep Turkey-aligned forces away from its borders.
— Türkiye maintained strong pro-Hamas rhetoric while simultaneously building a growing network of Arab partnerships. It now seeks a role in monitoring a Gaza ceasefire, while keeping minimal ties with Israel to avoid direct confrontation or U.S./economic consequences.
— Turkish-Israeli rivalry centers on who will fill the power vacuum in the Levant (Syria/Lebanon) rather than direct bilateral conflict. Failed attempts at “de-confliction mechanisms” keep the risk of friction alive, despite neither side wanting war.
— No single actor can impose a “new Middle East order.” The region is entering a phase defined by flexible blocs and localized balances of power. Türkiye, Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia are each trying to translate influence into lasting arrangements, but political and economic costs remain a strong deterrent to open escalation.
Sources:
- Frankfurter Rundschau – 15 Sept 2025
- Mena-Watch – 10 Sept 2025
- Internationale Politik – 18 Aug 2025
- Cicero – 15 April 2025
