Saudi Arabia is playing an increasingly prominent role in rehabilitating Syria and reintegrating it into the international community, especially following the rise of a new government with foreign policy priorities markedly different from those of former President Bashar al-Assad—most notably in its relationship with Iran. Riyadh’s outreach to this new government surprised some observers, given that the Kingdom had only recently pursued normalization with Assad, reopening its embassy in Damascus. Yet that earlier initiative failed to yield the desired results.
Saudi Arabia’s latest moves are widely seen as a reflection of political realism and a calculated attempt to pressure the Syrian regime into substantive political reforms through gestures of goodwill. Many political analyses suggest that Saudi Arabia was never truly invested in normalizing ties with Assad but viewed him as the only available option at the time, hoping to reach a workable arrangement. However, the Kingdom’s hopes—particularly its aim of halting the flow of Captagon produced in Syria and trafficked mainly into Saudi Arabia—were frustrated from the outset. Thus, Riyadh does not necessarily view Assad’s fall as a loss; in fact, it may see it as an opportunity to achieve its objectives more effectively.
A complicating factor is that the new Syrian government is rooted in a contemporary strain of political Islam (jihadist Salafism), with which Saudi Arabia is reluctant to engage. Moreover, Turkey’s robust support for interim President Ahmad al-Shar’a and Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) compels Riyadh to proceed cautiously, given the existing competition between Saudi Arabia and Turkey in various regional theaters, despite the easing of tensions between the two capitals.
It appears that this time, Saudi Arabia’s bold initiatives are driven by clear goals and principles that it intends to pursue regardless of the involvement of other key players in Syria, such as Russia, Turkey, and Iran. This analysis seeks to identify Riyadh’s objectives precisely and examine its ability to achieve them while managing disputes and rivalries with other influential actors on the Syrian stage.
Syria’s Importance to Regional Stability
It is evident that Saudi Arabia seeks regional stability—a secure, calm neighborhood that aligns with its ambitious plans to diversify its economy beyond oil and gas into new industries. The Kingdom aspires to become a hub for multinational corporations and a global trade nexus linking Europe, Asia, and Africa.
Saudi Arabia is targeting 150 million tourists annually in the future. None of this is feasible if ongoing wars and instability in the region deter investors and tourists from bringing their money into the Kingdom. Thus, Saudi Arabia wants to prevent Syria from sliding back into chaos or becoming a safe haven for terrorist groups like ISIS, which could once again destabilize the region.
Additionally, Riyadh aims to counter Iranian influence in Syria, as well as in Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen. More recently, combating organized crime in Syria—whose illicit drug production has caused severe social problems in Saudi Arabia—has become a particular priority.
One of the key factors encouraging Saudi Arabia to accept Syria’s new leadership is Ahmad al-Shar’a’s anti-Iran stance. Even though Saudi Arabia has pursued a less confrontational path with Tehran since resuming diplomatic relations in 2023, the weakening of Iran’s proxies and efforts by other actors to push Tehran back align with Riyadh’s interests as a regional power. Thus, the fracturing of the so-called Shia Crescent stretching from Iran to Lebanon—driven largely by HTS and Assad’s ouster under its leadership—represents positive news for Saudi Arabia.
A Renewed Regional Role
Saudi Arabia wants to reclaim a larger role in regional affairs, as it once had. On March 28, 2024, the Saudi defense minister brokered an agreement in Jeddah between the Syrian and Lebanese defense ministers, emphasizing the importance of delineating their shared border. This came after heightened tensions in March along the Lebanese-Syrian frontier, when Syrian authorities accused Hezbollah of infiltrating Syrian territory, kidnapping three soldiers, and executing them. The Syrian army responded by shelling targets inside Lebanon.
This indicates Saudi Arabia’s return to efforts to play a pivotal role in Syria and Lebanon after years of avoiding these complex and challenging issues. The Kingdom’s new approach focuses on stabilizing Syria and preventing it from becoming a base for armed groups that could threaten regional security.
The collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime and the weakening of Hezbollah have significantly diminished Iran’s influence in both Syria and Lebanon. Since late 2024, Saudi Arabia has actively sought to prevent its regional rival from regaining ground while simultaneously entrenching its own influence in both countries.
Engagement Over Withdrawal
Saudi Arabia is not the only player in Syria, but it appears Riyadh has concluded that engaging in Syria’s political landscape and leveraging its competitive strengths is preferable to withdrawing and leaving the field to others. Turkey is expanding its influence in northern Syria through its military presence and support for Syrian factions.
Meanwhile, the fall of Damascus’s regime has altered Iran’s dynamics—Tehran had helped keep Assad in power and now strives to reclaim some sway over Syria, a prospect Riyadh deeply fears. Additionally, Israel has become a constant thorn in Saudi Arabia’s side by weakening Syria’s new government and armed forces, as well as by cultivating political and economic ties with Druze leaders to gain leverage over the community and position itself as a key player in Syria.
All these factors compel Saudi Arabia to act, aiming to prevent sectarian conflict in Syria and secure its borders with Jordan and Iraq, which are vulnerable to spillover from Syria—whether via extremist Sunni ideology, Iran-backed militias, or the Captagon trade. Riyadh’s long-term interests lie in reviving Saudi influence in Syria and the broader region. There is a growing sense in Riyadh that it must reassess its Syria strategy to balance the country’s stability against the expanding influence of Turkey, Iran, and Israel.
While Riyadh and Ankara both aim to curb Iran’s influence in Syria, they also remain competitors. Moreover, Turkey is allied with Qatar, a longstanding Saudi rival, prompting Riyadh to eye Ankara’s growing regional reach with suspicion.
Turkey backs the Syrian National Army (SNA), a coalition of militias controlling key areas in northern Syria such as Afrin, parts of Aleppo’s countryside, and the so-called Euphrates Shield zones. Formed under Turkish patronage in 2017, the SNA is estimated to have between 35,000 and 70,000 fighters. Its mission largely supports Turkey’s strategic objectives by preventing the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) from establishing political autonomy in northeast Syria.
The SNA also participated in the offensives that toppled Assad’s regime, extending its presence beyond its traditional areas. Riyadh may worry that Ankara’s expanding role—especially its use of the SNA and the repatriation of Syrian refugees to reshape demographics and build loyal enclaves around Turkmen and other allied groups—could shift the regional balance in Turkey’s favor at Saudi Arabia’s expense.
Saudi Arabia recognizes Turkey’s dominant influence in Syria, particularly through its military footprint. Yet Riyadh believes it can offset Ankara’s sway with its diplomatic and economic clout, especially by forging strong ties with Syrian social forces like the Arab tribes of northeast Syria. Thus, the Kingdom finds itself compelled to devise a partnership formula with Turkey—acknowledging Ankara’s strength while prioritizing efforts to block Iran’s return.
Israel’s Calculations and Saudi Fears
On another front, Israel’s expansion of its military footprint in the Golan Heights beyond the areas it occupied in 1967, its moves into the UN-monitored demilitarized zone since Assad’s fall in December 2024, and its increasingly frequent air raids on Syrian targets all threaten Riyadh’s vision of a stable, unified Syria free from Iranian influence.
In this volatile environment, Iran could still regain a foothold in Syria—despite its current weakened state—by exploiting continued security turmoil to rebuild military pockets in the country and maintain supply lines to Hezbollah in Lebanon. Saudi Arabia fears this would destabilize Syria, bolster Iran’s regional standing, and complicate its broader efforts to counter Tehran’s proxies across the Middle East.
Saudi Arabia believes that a substantial presence in Syria and bolstered stabilization efforts could help achieve a balance with other powers, making Riyadh an indispensable player in the Syrian equation. The Kingdom understands that Syria’s political stability hinges on improvements in humanitarian and economic conditions—areas where Saudi Arabia, with its vast financial resources, can make the biggest difference.
Riyadh could also supply Damascus with discounted oil to offset the collapse of Iranian imports and pressure Western partners to ease sanctions so international aid can be more effective. Moreover, Saudi companies are ready to play a key role in developing Syria’s strategic infrastructure and core industries. This aligns with Riyadh’s broader strategic goal of fostering regional economic integration and establishing trade corridors across the Arabian Peninsula.
Building Trust With the New Administration
Saudi Arabia’s position on combating terrorism is unequivocal, and it naturally harbors suspicions toward Islamist and Salafist political groups, which ultimately view the Kingdom—guardian of Islam’s holiest sites—as an adversary. The ideological roots of HTS and al-Shar’a in al-Qaeda and ISIS are thus red flags for Riyadh, which also fears Syria could become a launchpad for spreading extremist ideas across the region.
Recognizing this, al-Shar’a’s movement is now working to dispel these concerns, highlighting its pragmatism by opening channels of communication with Arab states. Shar’a even chose Riyadh as the destination for his first foreign visit as president.
Saudi Arabia appears to have thoroughly examined the Syrian file and taken note of Shar’a’s rhetorical signals of moderation. It is now prepared to extend cautious trust to the new government and will closely monitor whether HTS follows through on its promises and perhaps leaves its jihadist past behind.
Saudi Arabia will strive to reshape the new Syrian regime’s Islamic character, promoting nationalism over transnational Islamist networks. It has also called for more diverse representation within Syria’s governing structures and welcomed the latest Syrian cabinet lineup, which includes figures from outside HTS.
Outlook
- Saudi Arabia is handling the Syrian file with marked pragmatism, seeking to capitalize on the regional moment after Assad’s fall to reposition itself smartly.
- It has decided to bet on Syria’s new regime, even if it is rooted in groups once accused of terrorism.
- Riyadh does not want to leave the field open to others; it believes engagement is better than withdrawal—those absent today will have no say tomorrow.
- Saudi Arabia’s current aim is to achieve a kind of regional balance, not only by weakening Iran but also by containing Turkey’s expansion and preventing Israel from having a free hand in southern Syria. This is all part of a broader vision to make the Kingdom a pillar of regional stability, serving its ambitious economic plans.
- Its stance toward Ahmad al-Shar’a’s government remains cautious, yet Saudi Arabia seems willing to give it a chance, especially since Shar’a has offered conciliatory, pragmatic messages that Riyadh values. Although Shar’a is backed by Turkey, Saudi Arabia knows alliances are not permanent—and that a balance of interests could create opportunities to work even with former adversaries.
