Europe has long played a pivotal role in the modern history of the Middle East, particularly in carving it up into states and entities during the British and French mandates. Even after the colonial era ended, European influence remained strong, shaping leaderships and political parties at the expense of others, and shifting power centers across the Arab world. However, this influence began to decline and, at times, even became reciprocal — with European countries now being affected by events in the Middle East. This is evident through Arab migrants residing in the West, waves of refugees driven by political crises and wars, and how migration — especially from Middle Eastern countries — has become a critical factor in determining election outcomes and shaping party platforms. It has also contributed to security challenges stemming from the activity of terrorist organizations.
This study explores the current influence of the European Union on the Middle East and its political transformations, the changes that have affected this role, and the reasons behind its decline in recent years. It also examines the future of relations between the EU and Middle Eastern countries and prospects for their cooperation.
A declining role
It seems that European countries’ influence in the Middle East has diminished in recent years, despite geographical proximity and historic and political ties. Meanwhile, the region has witnessed an expansion of influence by global powers such as the United States, China, and Russia, as well as a growing role for regional powers like Iran, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia. European countries have shifted from being powerful, active players in Arab countries even after colonialism ended, to pursuing cautious and hesitant policies in dealing with Middle Eastern events and geopolitical changes. Often, their voice merely echoes U.S. policy — or influences it in specific cases.
Historical overview
During the turbulent decades following World War II, European influence in the Middle East slowly eroded. France, which had colonized North Africa, and the United Kingdom, which ruled Egypt and Iraq and dominated the Gulf, failed to develop a deeper understanding of Arab and Islamic cultures. Neither state forged close relationships in the region after the colonial era ended.
The two great powers — France and Britain — were reluctant to give up their colonies. Algeria’s struggle for independence resulted in a long, bloody war that left indelible scars. In 1956, the UK and France — with Israel’s help — launched a failed campaign to seize the Suez Canal after Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalized it. They failed due to Soviet and American opposition, in a rare show of shared interest that did not last. With France and Britain stepping back, Washington and Moscow expanded their Cold War rivalry into the region.
The rise of nationalist movements in the Middle East led to military clashes and violent revolutions that brought leaders like Nasser, Muammar Gaddafi, Saddam Hussein, and Hafez al-Assad to power. Then came the Islamic reaction — both Sunni and Shia — which drove Iranian and Turkish intervention, along with jihadist movements such as al-Qaeda and ISIS.
Because of Europe’s lack of direct intervention in the region, it found itself unable to stop the flow of millions of refugees displaced by fighting in Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon. It was forced to close its borders despite the EU charter. When that failed, it had to pay billions to Turkey to prevent refugees from leaving its shores. This dependence hinders the EU’s ability to respond to new flare-ups caused by Ankara’s “neo-Ottoman” policy aimed at reclaiming former Ottoman territories.
Europe’s stance on two major issues that challenge Middle East stability today — the Arab-Israeli conflict and Iran’s drive to acquire nuclear weapons — further diminished the EU’s role, especially at the popular level.
The Arab-Israeli conflict
The Arab-Israeli conflict has long been a cornerstone of Europe’s relationship with the Arab world. Many European countries, led by Germany, viewed the creation of a Jewish state as a way to atone for centuries of persecution culminating in the Holocaust.
Traditionally, European nations favored Arab states that supplied the oil they desperately needed and offered ready markets for their arms industries. Yet this did not prevent them from firmly supporting Israel: France in particular helped build Israel’s fledgling defense industry, assisted in establishing a nuclear reactor, and culminated this cooperation in the joint Suez operation.
After the Six-Day War and the ensuing Arab oil embargo, Western economies suffered. Various initiatives emerged to bridge the gap between Israel and Arab states. Ultimately, only a few bilateral economic agreements were signed, none addressing the conflict directly.
Europe later called for the creation of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza before any normalization with Arab states — even though Egypt and Jordan had already made peace with Israel. While Israel actively sought new ways to reach out to its neighbors, Europe continued to condemn it for steps claimed to undermine prospects for a resolution.
Nonetheless, Israel conducts 40% of its international trade with the EU and has extensive economic, scientific, and aviation agreements. It also participates in the EU’s “Horizon 2000” program for research and innovation, with Israeli institutions benefiting from significant grants.
The Arab Spring and waning U.S. involvement
The 2011 Arab Spring, initially supported by the West, fell short of expectations. Syria descended into chaos, unleashing new refugee waves into Europe. Recently, EU influence over the U.S. has declined as Washington steps back, signaling its intent to reduce involvement in the region.
As Europe’s role diminished, new alliances began to reshape the region. Russia, Iran, and Turkey emerged as main actors, while Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states started playing more prominent roles. The region now faces three destabilizing political-military forces with conflicting agendas: Iran, Turkey, and jihadist movements, opposed by a front of pragmatic Sunni Arab states backed by the U.S. and increasingly Israel, due to the Iranian threat.
Unlike Israel and Arab states, Europe seems indifferent to Iran’s destabilizing role in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and Lebanon. France and the UK, along with Germany, joined the Iran nuclear negotiations, signing the deal alongside the U.S. under President Obama. This agreement did not dismantle Iran’s nuclear facilities but imposed only a 10-year cap, after which Iran could legally build nuclear weapons — all while Europe remains in range of Iranian ballistic missiles still in development. European countries even devised alternative mechanisms to bypass U.S. sanctions.
The Lebanese, Libyan, and Syrian files
France, proud of having helped establish and still “protect” Lebanon, did nothing to stop Hezbollah from taking over the country and using it in its war against Israel. Paris refused to label Hezbollah a terrorist organization. With France’s waning influence, President Emmanuel Macron’s initiative to promote a national unity government after the Beirut port explosion failed.
In Libya, where European countries were partly responsible for Gaddafi’s downfall, Brussels is far from united. Each state acts on its own interests: France backs eastern strongman General Khalifa Haftar (alongside Russia and Egypt), while Italy supports Fayez al-Sarraj’s UN-backed government, which relies on Muslim Brotherhood militias and Turkish military aid.
Why has European influence declined?
The most significant obstacle to forging leading EU influence is the difficulty of reaching unified external decisions requiring consensus among all member states. This inevitably hampers decisive action on any Middle Eastern conflict, given Europe’s internal divisions and differing national interests.
Additionally, the EU’s overall strategic standing has declined in favor of other global powers, especially the U.S., Russia, and China. Europe itself recognizes this reality amid growing internal splits over most foreign policy issues, placing direct constraints on the possibility of independent, unified, and effective European action during crises. Thus, Europe’s focus often shifts to trying to influence other major players in the region.
When we speak of Europe and the Middle East, we mainly refer to three countries: France, the UK, and Germany. Among them, there is only limited agreement — the Middle East is chiefly seen through the lens of migration concerns. There is a genuine focus across Europe on the need for regional stability to prevent new migration waves that could disrupt liberal European politics. But recent developments in Ukraine and economic rivalry with China have pushed European attention away from the Middle East toward Russia and China.
Given U.S. prioritization of its growing concerns over China, Beijing has become Europe’s second top priority, after Russia due to its war on the EU’s doorstep.
Yet the Middle East asserts its relevance as a vital source and transit hub for global energy and goods. Thus, major EU countries have a real interest in maintaining regional stability. The UK and France, in particular, play roles in the Red Sea and the Gulf. They therefore need a more coherent foreign policy toward the Middle East.
The numbers tell a different story
Despite talk of declining EU influence, economic figures suggest otherwise. Europe, with a combined population of 450 million and an economy rivaling the U.S. and China, dwarfs Russia’s — even though Russia has a stronger presence in the Middle East despite its economy being roughly the size of the EU’s smallest G7 member. Observers attribute this to the Middle East’s nature as a zone of violent conflict where hard power matters more than the soft power the EU has favored since WWII.
Europe makes some military efforts: French and British arms sales to Gulf states, for example. But Europe is weak in hard power, lacking collective military clout. Individual countries like France and the UK maintain strong presences, with France active in Syria and with naval capabilities.
These countries are also overstretched. France and the UK struggle to maintain global roles — engaging in the Indo-Pacific alongside the U.S., staying present in the Middle East, and serving as NATO’s European backbone. They cannot do everything perfectly, which is a major challenge for them in the post-colonial era. Meanwhile, Germany focuses on building up its military to defend Europe from Russia. Increasingly, it appears the Middle East is a place where European countries will find it hard to sustain their historical level of involvement.
The future of European influence
After WWII, European states aligned almost entirely with the U.S., a policy that protected EU interests for decades. But political circumstances have changed. The U.S. began downplaying its alliance with Europe, especially under President Trump, pushing European powers toward greater independence.
Today, Europe faces threats from Russia, is caught in economic competition with China, and its economic partnership with the U.S. is weakening due to American isolationism — all of which limits the EU’s ability to project hard power outside its borders, especially in the short term.
At the same time, the Middle East is increasingly important to Europe economically: as a vital corridor for shipping, energy, and investments, and as a promising consumer market. This has led to recent European political and economic moves toward Middle Eastern states — notably French President Macron’s visit to Cairo in April 2025, where France and Egypt signed a joint declaration elevating ties to a strategic partnership.
A change in tone and new openings
Recently, Western officials’ rhetoric on issues long emphasized by Europe — such as democracy and human rights — has shifted. For example, Macron stressed respect for state sovereignty, saying he does not accept being lectured by any president on how to run his country, adding: “Therefore, I do not advise presidents on how to govern theirs.”
There is also a noticeable change in Western statements on Israel and Gaza, with a more neutral tone. Even Germany, traditionally an unwavering supporter of Israel, began to reconsider. Chancellor Friedrich Merz said Israeli strikes on Gaza cause civilian losses that can no longer be justified as a war on terrorism, adding: “Inflicting such harm on civilians, as increasingly seen in recent days, cannot be justified as a war on Hamas.”
Meanwhile, Europe was quick to engage with Syria’s new administration after Bashar al-Assad. Brussels hosted a donor conference in March 2025 attended by Syrian government representatives, aimed at rallying international support for a country devastated by more than a decade of war. It also marked a new chapter in Europe’s ties with Syria’s new Islamic-leaning administration. This reflects Europe’s growing understanding of Middle Eastern cultural specificities and greater confidence in Arab allies, especially Saudi Arabia and the Gulf, given their internal transformations and social-political openness over the past decade.
All this indicates a European desire to re-engage more deeply in Middle Eastern affairs after losing ground to expanding U.S., Russian, and Chinese influence. Europe now seeks a new role to restore its influence in its vital neighborhood, aiming to maintain strategic autonomy — to be not merely a follower of U.S. policy in the Middle East, but an active, impactful partner.
European countries often have interests that differ from U.S. priorities — for example, energy. Many Middle Eastern states such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Iraq supply Europe with energy, crucial as Europe tries to diversify away from Russia. There are also joint energy projects with regional countries — like the pipeline from Israel through Jordan to Lebanon — that could bolster European energy security. Syria is emerging as a potential source of gas and minerals, with possible projects like a gas pipeline from Qatar to Europe via the Mediterranean, alongside reconstruction ventures in war-torn states that could benefit European companies if things go well.
Europe also has an interest in combating violence in the Middle East, which requires confronting Iranian influence, especially in Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq. It could play a role by maintaining limited military presences or helping build national armies to curb Iran-backed militias. European countries could also work more seriously on tackling political Islam movements based in Europe that exploit European democracy to spread their ideas and fund activities destabilizing many Arab states. Western intelligence can offer more support and information to maximize cooperation with Arab governments in fighting extremist groups like ISIS and others.
